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FUTURE NONADVANCE OBLIGATIONS:
PREFERENCES LOST IN METAPHOR
F. STEPHEN KNIPPENBERG*
Every law student learns that in tort events occur in a chain, that in
contract minds meet, that in property rights are gathered in bundles. It
seems reasonable to suppose that on some level everyone who studies law
knows these images for what they are-mere metaphors, characterizations
of things in one domain of experience in terms of things from another,
perhaps wholly unrelated, domain.' At least it would appear safe to assume
as much in the cases of causal chains, meeting minds, bundles of rights,
and the like.
Leaving aside such artifacts of the legal imagination as have accumulated
along the way in the evolution of doctrine, and excluding from consider-
ation such otherwise cognitively unmanageable fields of study as, say,
constitutional law, with its "penumbras," "ripeness," and "standing,"'
surely there are curricular safe harbors where understanding can be had
directly without resort to fanciful allusion. Commercial law, a collection of
crisp, utilitarian rules governing the no-nonsense stuff that occupies
merchants, bankers, and their lawyers, springs irresistibly to mind.
Teaching a course in secured transactions or bankruptcy is enough to
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma Law Center. The author wishes to express his
appreciation to Elizabeth Warren and Lynn LoPucki for their encouragement and thoughtful suggestions
on various drafts of this article, to Larry Ponoroff for his many recommendations and insights through
several drafts, and to William Richman for his counsel and stylistic suggestions.
1. "The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of
another." GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, THE METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 5 (1980). The discussion
that follows draws extensively on the works of Lakoff and Johnson who jointly advanced Experientialist
cognitive theory, beginning with The Metaphors We Live By. This inaugural work was followed by
MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND
REASON (1987), and GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES
REVEAL AaouT THE MIND (1987), which together supply the empirical grounding of the Experientialist
position, locate that position within philosophical and language theory contexts, and elaborate
Experientialist postulates to account for a broad range of human cognitive activities.
There have been several theories on the cognitive aspects of metaphor proposed by linguists,
philosophers, and others, including Comparison theory, Ionic Signification theory, and the Verbal
Opposition theory. For a useful summary of these and the epistemological issues they raise and address,
see 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 284 (1967).
2. See infra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Winter's metaphoric analysis
of standing doctrine).
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disabuse nearly anyone of the notion that these are, finally, subjects free of
imaginative devices like metaphor. For students in an Article 9 course, for
instance, the first several weeks are mainly a struggle to consign ideas like
priority and attachment to the provinces of existing conceptual referents,
in the familiar company of which they become meaningful. Priority is a
concept which inevitably must be understood in terms of more prosaic
instantiations of the concepts on-top-of, above, or ahead of, developed
elsewhere in conceptual experience. (In a fight, the winner is on top of the
vanquished, winners finish ahead of losers, and so on.) It must be
understood, that is to say, metaphorically.
Apart from my own classroom intuitions, in recent years there has
emerged a cognitive theory, Experientialism, which makes the case that
metaphor may be the single most pervasive cognitive mechanism of all
complex thought. This Experientialist insight, that metaphor is central to
cognitive operations, has important implications for legal discourse.3 Legal
doctrine, after all, is no more or less the product of ordinary human
cognitive principles than other intellectual endeavors,4 and its metaphoric
expression is much more than language employed to make discourse more
memorable and trenchant.
Nor is any substantive area of the law free of metaphor. There is no
comfort to be taken even in the practical, homely concepts generally
associated with the law of the merchant. The underlying assumption of this
Article is simply that the concepts by which commercial law is understood
are metaphoric concepts. I use the analytic method suggested by
Experientialism to make and support two basic claims. First, attention to
the metaphoric bases of legal doctrine opens new avenues of discourse to
disclose, explain, and thereby perhaps avoid, points of doctrinal impasse
3. In a series of poignant and insightful articles, beginning with The Metaphor of Standing and
the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988), Professor Steven L. Winter has
conclusively demonstrated the value to legal discourse of this new scholarship from the cognitive
sciences. In the article, he observes: "The law is committed to the use of reason. New discoveries about
the nature of reason, therefore, have a natural and necessary place in legal scholarship. To fail to
recognize them ultimately would be to deny the role of reason in the law." Id. at 1382. Professor Winter
establishes the serviceability of Experientialist theoretical principles in his analysis of the law of
standing that proceeds from an explication of its underlying metaphors. As he puts it, "[t]he key to
understanding-and to unlocking the barrier of standing law-lies in appreciating that the term
'standing' is a metaphor." Id. at 1382-83 (citation omitted). Professor Winter locates the dysfunctionality
of standing doctrine and proposes a functional substitute framework for the doctrine's reconstitution.
Id. at 1478-1508.
4. This point is an explicit premise in Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric
Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for the Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1989).
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encountered by ordinary textual analysis. Second, explication of the
metaphors by which legal doctrine is understood reveals how metaphoric
concepts on which there is widespread consensus stipulate the parameters
of discourse across an unsuspected range of issues.
The vehicle I use for this discourse is the lingering metaphysical debate
between two preeminent commercial law scholars, Grant Gilmore and Peter
Coogan, over the true nature of the Article 9 security interest, which is
necessarily called into question when deliberating on the priority of secured
future advances in the face of an intervening judgment lien. Part I outlines
the elements of the debate in conventional terms.
Part II offers an overview of the Experientialist epistemology and the
role it assigns to metaphor in thought. The overview prepares the way for
an explication in Part III.A. of the metaphoric concepts by which Article
9 is understood. Part III.B. makes explicit the underlying metaphoric
concepts inherent in the opposing doctrinal positions taken in the Coogan-
Gilmore debate on the question of future advance priorities. It also seeks
to demonstrate how those concepts stipulated the terms on which the debate
could be carried out, and how they spread to frustrate analysis of a related
but distinct priority issue, the priority treatment of what have been termed
future nonadvance obligations under Article 9.
Part IV describes another incarnation of the Coogan-Gilmore debate and
the practical consequences of the hiding power of metaphoric reasoning. In
this Part, I propose that Gilmore's metaphor of the unitary security interest,
having infected the controversy over secured future nonadvance priorities
under state law, has been carried to the bankruptcy arena, foreclosing
consideration of secured nonadvance obligations as entailing preferential
transfers. As a matter of bankruptcy policy, transfers to secure future
nonadvance obligations are otherwise excellent candidates for avoidance.
An implicit claim throughout is that acknowledgement of the metaphoric
nature of human conceptual systems advances exposition of doctrine
beyond argument about internal consistency of legal rules taken as a priori
propositions. While this clears the way for reconsideration and transforma-
tion of law, it does so without surrender to radical subjectivism and the
sense of ennui that follows from the prospect that legal rules are endlessly
manipulable. Legal concepts are reassuringly grounded in shared experience
that serves as their conceptual basis.
1994] 1539
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I. THE COOGAN-GILMORE DEBATE
A. Future Advance Priorities
Article 9 arranges the life of a security interest according to axioms of
creation, validity, perfection, priority in distribution, and default and
repossession. A consensual security interest begins with an agreement
exhibiting the intent that a security interest be created.' The security interest
attaches7 and becomes enforceable, however, only upon the coincidence of
three obligatory conditions: there must generally be a writing (in commem-
oration of the security agreement) meeting certain formalities;8 the debtor
must have rights in the collateral to be the subject of the interest;9 and the
secured party must have given value.'" Of particular interest here is the
5. See Peter F. Coogan, The Intelligent Lawyer's Guide to Secured Transactions, in 1 SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, ch. 2, §§ 2.01-2.06 (Peter F. Coogan et al.
eds., 1994). Article 9 is not, in fact, strictly ordered in quite this way. For example, Part 3, having to
do with priorities, follows Part 2 governing matters of creation and validity, includes provisions relating
to perfection, and precedes Part 4 on filing. Nevertheless, the organization proposed in the text describes
the experiential life of the security interest with a fair degree of accuracy, and it is the standard
conceptual organization given Article 9 by the familiar treatises. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965); JAMES J. WHITE & RICHARD S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE chs. 22-25 (3d ed. 1988).
6. Section 9-105(l)(1) defines a security agreement as "an agreement which creates or provides
for a security interest." U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(1) (1990). A security interest, in turn, is defined in § I-
201(37) as "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an
obligation." There are, however, nonconsensual security interests as well. See, e.g., § 9-113 (governing
security interests arising under Article 2 on sales).
7. "The term 'attach' is used in... [Article 9] to describe the point at which property becomes
subject to a security interest." U.C.C. § 9-303 cmt. 1 (1990).
8. The writing must contain a description of the collateral and the debtor's signature. U.C.C. § 9-
203(1)(a) (1990). Its function is evidentiary, § 9-203 cmt. 2, and is thus in the nature of a statute of
frauds, § 9-203 cmt. 3. Accordingly, the writing may be dispensed with where the secured party takes
possession of the collateral to evidence the security interest. § 9-203(1)(a).
9. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c) (1990). Just what is meant by "rights in the collateral" is not made
explicit in Article 9. It appears that while mere possession is not enough, absolute ownership is not
required. It is worth noting that the debtor is not required to have rights in the collateral at the time the
security agreement is signed and value is given by the secured creditor, as in the case of an obligation
secured by receivables and inventory which are regularly depleted and restored to various levels. For
a discussion of various battles fought over the question of what constitutes sufficient rights in the
collateral to satisfy the statutory requirement, see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 26-2.
10. U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(b) (1990). In general, this section has proved mainly uninteresting-that
is, it has not given the courts much trouble, although there are a few cases in which it was
unpersuasively argued that a secured party gives no value for a security interest securing a preexisting
claim. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 26-2.
[VOL. 72:1537
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value requirement, although for the moment it is enough to say that value
is regarded as given upon the extension of credit or the making of a
binding commitment to extend credit in futuro."
Once created, a valid, enforceable security interest is eligible to be
perfected, a matter of some importance since it is perfection that decides
a secured party's priority position relative to the claims of others to the
collateral.' 2 Perfection is accomplished on fulfilling the requirements
necessary to validity just enumerated, together with an additional notice-
giving step,'3 usually the filing of a financing statement. 4 While the
11. U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(a) (1990).
12. "A perfected security interest may still be or become subordinate to other interests... but in
general after perfection the secured party is protected against creditors and transferees of the debtor and
in particular against any representative of creditors in insolvency proceedings instituted by or against
the debtor." U.C.C. § 9-303 cmt. 1 (1990).
There are precious few claims subordinated to an unperfected security interest. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-
301(l)(b) (1990) (providing that an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the claim of a lien
creditor whose lien arose prior to perfection). Similarly, in the case of two secured parties who have
extended credit to the debtor on the strength of the same collateral but neither of whom has filed or
taken possession of the collateral to perfect, the first to become perfected has priority. See § 9-312(5)
cmt. 5.
There are exceptions. For example, as between two secured parties, both of whom file to perfect
their security interests, the first to file, rather than the first to perfect, has priority on the grounds that
the later filer discovered, or should have, the earlier financing statement admonishing searchers of the
yet-to-be-perfected security interest. Id. There is also an exception for purchase money security interests.
See § 9-312(2)-(4).
13. See U.C.C. § 9-402 cmt. 2 (1990). The "notice filing system" referred to in the comment is
a concept borrowed from the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, and nominally is an instrument of public
notice to would-be lenders against collateral already encumbered by an Article 9 security interest. See
Peter F.Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Other Recent Chattel Security
Laws, Including "Notice Filing", 47 IOWA L. REV. 289, 290 (1962) (comparing the requirements of the
traditional filing statements with the less rigorous requirements of notice filing). To the degree it
suggests that public notice is the exclusive or even primary function of the Article 9 filing system,
however, the term "notice filing" may be somewhat misleading. Article 9 adopted the notice filing
system as much to avoid fanatical attendance upon documentary details that characterized the preCode
law governing interests in personal property to secure indebtedness. Professor Baird has argued that the
notice-giving function of the system was intended to alleviate problems in the narrow case of competing
secured creditors, whereas in reality its principal function is one of availing a secured party to stake its
claim to the collateral after the fashion of a prospector for minerals. See Douglas G. Baird, Notice Filing
and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL STuD. 53, 62 (1983). See also F. Stephen
Knippenberg, Debtor Name Changes and Collateral Transfers Under 9-402(7): Drafling from the
Outside-In, 52 Mo. L. REv. 57, 61-63 nn.23-30 (1987) (discussing the notice and "claim-staking"
functions of the financing statement).
14. There are, in fact, three methods of perfection. In some cases, the secured party may at its
election either file to perfect or take possession of the collateral. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1), 9-305
(1990) (providing that a security interest in goods may be perfected by filing or taking possession at
the option of the secured party). In other cases, the security interest can only be perfected by taking
Washington University Open Scholarship
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conditions for perfection must at some point coalesce, they need not arise
in any special order. For example, filing, notionally the final step, might
well precede any or all of the steps necessary to validity (say, the drafting
of a security agreement); a security agreement may be executed in advance
of the debtor's acquisition of rights in the collateral; either or both may
either precede or succeed filing; and so on in as many combinations as the
number of steps will allow. 5
In any event, generally speaking, priority is very much a matter of
becoming perfected before other secured parties in cases where two secured
parties have competing interests in the same collateral, or, in other cases,
of becoming perfected before an unsecured creditor acquires a judicial lien
and levies on the collateral.' 6 To have priority is to have the first opportuni-
ty to sack the debtor's encumbered personalty to satisfy an outstanding,
unsatisfied claim. 7
Against the background of the life of a security interest we turn to what
has come to be called the Coogan-Gilmore debate," referring to the
exchange between Grant Gilmore and Peter Coogan on how correctly to
conceptualize the security interest.' 9 The Coogan-Gilmore debate results
from facially incompatible concepts of the security interest, namely, the
possession, § 9-304(1) (requiring that a security interest in instruments be perfected by taking possession
of the instrument), or only by filing, §§ 9-302 to 305 (covering cases where the collateral is accounts
receivable). There are a few instances in which a security interest is perfected on attachment without
more. See, e.g., § 9-302(l)(d) (regarding purchase money security interests in consumer goods). Of
course, where the collateral is a debtor's inventory or equipment, taking possession is not an option as
a practical matter, and, in any event, most security interests are perfected by filing. WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 5, § 26-2.
15. See U.C.C. § 9-303(1) & cmt. 1 (1990).
16. This particular rule of priority, contained in U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1990), is especially relevant
to the upcoming discussion of future advance and nonadvance secured obligations.
17. "The usual outcome in a priority conflict under the Code is that the winning party satisfies
himself in ull out of the collateral before the subordinate party satisfies himself to any extent." WHITE
& SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 24-2, at 1126 (emphasis added).
18. For an introduction to the Coogan-Gilmore debate, see David Gray Carlson & Paul M.
Shupack, JudicialLien Piorities Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Part , 5 CARDOZO
L. REV. 287, 350 (1987); Harry M. Flechtner, Inflatable Liens and Like Phenomena: Converting
Unsecured Obligations into Secured Debt Under U.C.C. Article 9 and the Banluptcy Code, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 696, 721 (1987); and Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Future
Nonadvance Obligations Under Article 9 of the UCC: Legitimate Priority or Unwarranted Squeeze.
Out?, 102 BANKING L.L 412, 418 (1985).
19. Coogan seems to have first discovered and raised the point. See Peter F. Coogan, Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among Secured Creditors and the 'Floating Lien,'72 HARv.
L. REv. 838, 868 (1959) [hereinafter Coogan, Floating Lien]. Gilmore took up the question in his
monumental treatise, 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 935 (1965).
[VOL. 72:1537
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multiple view championed by Coogan, and the unitary view advanced by
Gilmore.2" To understand how there can remain at this late date a
controversy over something so fundamental as the very nature of the
Article 9 security interest,2t it is necessary to understand something of the
priority dispute involving the secured party who seeks to satisfy an
obligation stemming from multiple advances made intermittently to its
debtor.
When matters are so ordered that the secured creditor and debtor
anticipate more than a single extension of credit in the course of their
relationship," it may fairly be asked whether value is given afresh with
each advance, spawning a series of discrete security interests, or whether
a single security interest is created on the first advance, with subsequent
advances acting only to affect the extent of the obligation secured by that
single interest.'
Coogan's view is that a new and separate security interest arises with
20. I borrow the terms "multiple view" and "unitary view" from Schroeder & Carlson, supra note
18, at 418-19.
21. Schroeder and Carlson remark, "[lit is late in the day to be wrangling over the exact nature
of a security interest under Article 9 .... Id. at 412. Given that the first official text of the Uniform
Commercial Code was published in 1952, it would seem the concept would by now have been so far
developed and elaborated that nothing remains to be said of it. On the other hand, the fact that this is
not the case seems entirely unremarkable when it is understood that concepts, like the security interest,
are metaphoric and by definition incomplete to begin with.
22. After a long spell of common law and statutory retentiveness on the subject (what the drafter
of comment 5 to § 9-204 calls "a vaguely articulated prejudice against future advance agreements"),
a security interest securing advances yet to be given was made unarguably respectable by § 9-204(3).
U.C.C. § 9-204(3) (1990).
Notwithstanding that § 9-204 seems to usher in a new era of tolerance for future advance lending
on a secured basis, it seems the value and utility of these transactions was, in fact, recognized at least
as early as the nineteenth century. Bruce A. Campbell, Contracts Jurisprudence and Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: The Allowable Scope of Future Advance and All Obligations Clauses in
Commercial Security Agreements, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1007, 1008 (1986) (quoting Ackerman v.
Hunsicker, 85 N.Y. 43, 47 (1881), a New York Court of Appeals decision that recognized the validity
of mortgages to secure future advances or liabilities). Indeed, it has been proposed that comment 5 to
§ 9-204, quoted from above, is misleading, in that the preCode law governing chattel security was
favorably disposed to secured future advance lending. Campbell, supra, at 1020. See also infra note 35.
23. It is a question fairly asked because U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(b) (1990) provides that giving value
is one of the three conditions of attachment, but does not require that value precede or follow the other
conditions in some prescribed formal procession. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Section 9-
303(1) concomitantly anticipates that the final step to perfection (of which attachment, with its three
conditions, is taken as one) might well, and frequently does, precede attachment. See also § 9-312(5)(a)
(ranking priority among conflicting security interests according to filing (perfection step) or perfection
(filing or other perfection step plus attachment)). With each subsequent advance-subsequent, that is,
to all other conditions of attachment-multiple attachments, and so separate instances of perfection,
become a conceptual possibility.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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each extension of credit, and that the lender accumulates multiple perfected
security interests on making multiple advances.24 In Gilmore's view, the
value requirement is a touchstone which, once visited on the first extension
of credit, requires no further attention.' Value is given with the first
advance, and that is that. On Gilmore's unitary view, a single perfected
security interest safeguards the aggregation of obligations; the single
security interest expands and contracts as additional extensions of credit
and payments on the debtor's account are made.26 The expansion and
contraction are accompanied of necessity by a corresponding blossoming
and withering of the debtor's equity in the collateral.
The circumstances that gave rise to the Coogan-Gilmore debate and its
practical consequences are best appreciated in the context of a simple
illustration. Suppose that on January 1 Lender and Borrower sign a security
agreement creating a security interest in equipment in which Borrower has
rights, and that Lender advances $100,000.27 That same day, Lender files
a financing statement. As of January 1, Lender (now properly referred to
as a "secured party"'28 in the argot of Article 9) has a perfected security
interest 9 protecting the advance against default by Borrower (now properly
the "debtor"3 in Article 9 parlance).
Suppose further that two additional advances of $100,000 each are
thereafter made, one on January 15, the other on January 30."3 Should the
debtor default on the obligation, now measured by the three advances, it is
clear the secured party is in a position to move against the collateral to
satisfy so much of the $300,000 obligation as the value of the collateral
will allow.32 As between the debtor and the secured party, the matter is
24. See Coogan, Floating Lien, supra note 19, at 868.
25. 2 Gilmore, supra note 19, at 937-38.
26. See 2 id.
27. Thus are satisfied the three requirements for the attachment, hence validity and enforceability,
of an Article 9 security interest. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
28. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(m) (1990).
29. U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1990).
30. U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(d) (1990).
31. Such advances might be made "pursuant to commitment" or might be discretionary. An
advance is made pursuant to commitment where "the secured party has bound himself to make it."
U.C.C. § 9-105(I)(k) (1990). For the significance of this distinction, see infra notes 41-42.
32. Under U.C.C. § 9-201 (1990), the "security agreement is effective according to its terms
between the parties .... In the illustration, the terms include the future advance clause. The secured
party's rights upon default may be provided for in the security agreement, subject to certain limitations,
§ 9-501(1), and are delineated throughout Part 5 of Article 9. See, e.g., § 9-503 (secured party's right
to take possession of the collateral upon default); § 9-504(1) (secured party's right to sell, lease, or
otherwise dispose of the collateral); § 9-502 (secured party's right to direct account debtors obligated
[VOL. 72:1537
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entirely one of enforcing the security interest, such that when or even
whether the security interest is perfected are questions of no moment.33
Whether the unitary view or multiple view enjoys hegemony is, at this
point, correspondingly irrelevant.
Suppose now, that, an intervening third player asserts a claim to the
collateral, a claim that finds its way into the interstice between the January
15 and January 30 advances. On January 20, a creditor, a trade creditor, let
us say, whom the debtor owes $100,000, acquires a judicial lien and levies
on the equipment subject to the security interest. There ensues a dispute in
which the secured party ventures to satisfy the entire $300,000 debt
representing the cumulated advances, and in which the trade creditor (now
a lien creditor)34 hopes to limit the secured party to a recovery measured
by the January 1 and January 15 advances totalling $200,000, the advances
made prior to the time the trade creditor achieved the status of lien creditor.
Otherwise, if the collateral brings $300,000 or less on disposition, the lien
creditor is "squeezed-out" '35 by the last advance and must look to other
assets--of which there may be none-in the effort to satisfy its claim.
Under the 1962 version of Article 9, there was but a single provision to
consult on the priority question under circumstances like those in our
to the debtor to make payments to the secured party on the debtor's default).
33. Whether there are several perfected security interests or a single perfected interest is a question
that the enforcement of the secured party's rights under Article 9 presents no occasion to entertain. The
family of rights the secured party may exercise against the debtor arise under U.C.C. § 9-201 (1990)
and Part 5 of Article 9, and are identical under either conception.
34. A lien creditor is "a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment,
levy or the like... ." U.C.C. § 9-201(3) (1990).
35. The term makes an early appearance in the drafter's comment accompanying the 1972
amendments. General Comment on the Approach of the Review Committee for Article 9, para. E-44,
reprinted in 3 U.L.A 30 (1992). The term becomes a powerful image in the hands of Schroeder &
Carlson, supra note 18, with which to challenge the unitary view.
By no means did lenders first come to provide for future advances in loan agreements with the
adoption of Article 9. There is doctrine antedating the Code that developed in response to real estate
lending practices. Early literature discussing the securing of future advances in the context of real estate
lending include Gerald L. Blackburn, Mortgages to Secure Future Advances, 21 Mo. L. REV. 209
(1956), and Albert P. Jones, Mortgages Securing Future Advances, 8 TEx. L. REv. 371 (1930). The
principles that came to govern future advances and real estate mortgages seem to have been applied
indifferently to preCode chattel mortgages as well. See Blackburn, supra, at 224. But see 2 GILMORE,
supra note 19, at 923. Gilmore states: "With... statutes on the real estate side and with the priority
provisions of Article 9... it is unlikely that the law of future advances will continue to be the same
for both real property and personal property security arrangements." 2 id. at 924 n.6 (citing Donal C.
Collimore, Comparison of Real Property Mortgages and Security Interests in Chattels to Secure Future
Advances, 36 CONN. B.J. 463 (1962)).
A standard treatment of future advance clauses and preCode chattel mortgages can be found in
GEORGE E. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 114 (1951).
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illustration, section 9-301(1)(b), which awarded priority to the lien creditor
if the lien arose prior to the secured party's becoming perfected. Dutifully
returning to the relevant provisions concerning perfection, we are only
reminded that perfection eventuates on the coincidence of filing and the
conditions necessary to attachment. Of the metaphysical question, whether
a single perfected security interest arose on January 1 with the initial
advance, or whether additional, discrete security interests appeared with the
January 15 and January 30 advances, the 1962 Code had nothing to say.36
In default of an answer, it was impossible to follow the first-in-time decree,
inasmuch as the question, who was first, was left very much up in the air
by this conceptual lapse. 7
Both Coogan and Gilmore responded to the question left open under the
1962 version of section 9-301, although why they chose to address the
issue at the conceptual level is not clear.38 In any event, proceeding from
Coogan's multiple view, there existed in our hypothetical on January 1 and
January 15 two distinct perfected security interests individually securing
36. California responded to the missing priority rule by resort to preCode law, which was
introduced into that state's version of the U.C.C. through a nonuniform amendment. See Uniform
Commercial Code, ch. 819, § 9312(7), 1963 CAL. STAT. 1849, 1984 (repealed 1965). In general, the
provision followed the unitary view by dating priority for future advances from the time the original
security interest was perfected. Following a stinging indictment of the provision as overbroad in Peter
F. Coogan, Intangibles as Collateral Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 HARV. L. REV. 997,
1021 (1964) [hereinafter Coogan, Intangibles), California repealed the subsection. Act of July 15, 1965,
ch. 1379, sec. 17, § 9312, 1965 CAL. STAT. 3285, 3293.
37. "Formulat[ing] a concept of the security interest created by the multiple disbursements of a
future advances arrangement" seemed an exercise in "Heraclitian metaphysics." Comment, Priority of
Future Advances Lending Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 128, 134 (1967)
[hereinafter Comment].
38. That is to say, Coogan and Gilmore might simply have treated the issue as a priority dispute
without explicit statutory resolution, reasoned their way to principled, albeit opposing, priority rules,
and left open the question of the nature (concept) of the security interest.
One of the doctrinal bases Coogan identified as lending support to the unitary view is U.C.C. § 9-
201 (1958), which provides that a security agreement is effective according to its terms against the
debtor, purchasers, and others. Coogan warned secured parties against relying on the concept of a single
security interest in any event, since in § 9-201 "[t]he question facing us is not whether the security
agreement is effective, but whether a particular security interest arising under that agreement is effective
as against ... [a judgment lien creditor]." Peter F. Coogan & Nahum L. Gordon, The Effect of the
Uniform Commercial Code Upon Receivables Financing-Some Answers and Some Unresolved
Problems, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1529, 1550 (1963) [hereinafter Coogan & Gordon, Receivables
Financing]. The commentators also noted that "[s]ection 9-201 says nothing about either priorities or
security interests." Id.
For a summary of the textual support in the 1958 Code for each of the two views, see Comment,
supra note 37, at 137-39.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss4/4
FUTURE NONADVANCE OBLIGATIONS
each of the $100,000 advances made on those dates.39 The subsequent
advance on January 30 became the subject of yet another perfected security
interest from the time that advance was made. For the January 30 advance,
all other requirements for attachment, and therefore perfection, were met
as of January 1, poised in readiness for the extension of value on that date.
But value arrived on January 30, fifteen days after the trade creditor's
judgment lien had insinuated itself between the second and third advances.
The result: the trade creditor is entitled to satisfy its lien out of the
collateral after the secured party has foreclosed on the debtor's equity to
the extent of the pre-lien advances.
Under Gilmore's unitary view, the advance on January 1 created a single
perfected security interest that endured throughout the life of the financial
relationship. The succeeding advances, those made on January 15 and
January 30, did no more than vary the contours of the single, ceaselessly
extant perfected interest.4" Employing this image, no interstice developed
in the security interest between the January 15 and January 30 advances
through which the trade creditor's lien might find its way to priority.
It is the latter feature of the unitary image that moved Coogan to argue
for the multiple view. Gilmore's view permitted a secured party to persist
in making advances with the associated obligations to repay them
consuming the debtor's equity in the collateral after the intervention of
other creditors, leaving nothing thereof out of which the intervenor might
satisfy its claim. Coogan believed the prospect of this sort of squeeze-out
to be pernicious.4' Gilmore, of course, was acutely aware of the threat of
39. Gilmore regarded Coogan's conceptualization to represent "the obvious answer." 2 GILMORE,
supra note 19, at 935.
40. See 2 id. at 937-38.
41. See Coogan, Floating Lien, supra note 19, at 868; Peter F. Coogan, The Effect of the Federal
Tax Lien Act of 1966 Upon Security Interests Created Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 HARv.
L. REV. 1369, 1398-99 (1968) [hereinafter, Coogan, Federal Tax Lien Act]. See also U.C.C. § 9-312,
official reasons for 1972 change, at n.5 (1990) (adopting Coogan's squeeze-out rationale).
This is perhaps as good a place as any to point out that Coogan and other advocates of the multiple
view distinguish between future advances made at the discretion of the secured party and those made
pursuant to commitment. Coogan argues for priority to be awarded the intervening lien creditor in the
former case, but would give priority to the secured party in the latter. See Coogan, supra, at 1398-99.
Carlson and Shupack, who argue forcefully for Coogan's multiple view under some conditions, seem
to agree that the case for priority of the secured party who makes postlien advances pursuant to a
commitment in the security agreement is stronger than the case for the secured party making
discretionary advances. See Carlson & Shupack, supra note 18, at 369. Their agreement, however, is
qualified on the grounds that "the reasons for seniority for these security interests are only as strong
as the secured party's commitment. The definition of 'commitment' [in U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(k)] is quite
loosely written." Id. They expose the prospect that a secured creditor might dilute the contractual
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squeeze-out that abided in the image created by his unitary view, but
dismissed it on the ground that all the while the debtor's equity in the
collateral was diminished by the mushrooming debt, in other quarters the
value of the debtor was enhanced by the advances themselves."
In any event, the priority dispute between the future advance lender and
the lien creditor was settled by the 1972 Amendments to Article 9, which
largely reflect Gilmore's unitary view.43 (Although whether it has been
commitment to make future advances by the simple expedient of a flabby definition of default in the
security agreement. Id.
42. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 19, at 939. Gilmore rejected the distinction between discretionary
and obligatory advances, the "advances made pursuant to commitment" of U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(k), as
meaningless. 2 GILMORE, supra note 19, at 938. Gilmore explained that contracts to lend money are
not specifically enforceable, and other remedies that might be available to the disappointed borrower
are either outside the possibility of recovery or anaemic beyond the point of being worth the trouble
to use. 2 id. at 926. For Gilmore, then, the future advance lender would have priority over intervening
lien creditors as to obligatory and discretionary advances alike. He conceded, however, that a rule
preserving the distinction might be useful "as a way of avoiding a hard and fast rule in a situation
where the equities seem to be in even balance." 2 id. at 938.
Carlson and Shupack, unlike Gilmore, would draw such a distinction in favor of a secured party
bound to make future advances and against one who had not, but like Gilmore are skeptical of the
distinction. See Carlson & Shupack, supra note 18, at 347-52. Their concern, however, is not with
having a distinction, but is instead with the practical difficulties of drawing it in the face of a secured
party's ability to define default in a self-serving fashion that would render the distinction impotent. See
generally id.
43. See U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (1990). Subsection (4) makes it clear that there will be occasions when
the claim of a future advance lender will be subordinate to the claim of an intervening lienholder, the
likes of the trade creditor in the illustration carried forward in the text. On the other hand, and
notwithstanding the suggestion in the language "only to the extent that" of a secured creditor brought
to heel, there is little cause for lien creditors to rejoice in the provision. As a close reading reveals, there
are precious few priority disputes from which the lienholder will emerge victorious against the future
advance lender. It should also be noted that other related priority issues were also resolved under the
1972 amendments, not just that between secured parties and judicial lien creditors. The amendments
anticipated as well priority disputes between future advance lenders and other Article 9 secured
creditors, see § 9-312(7), and between future advance lenders and buyers of the collateral, see § 9-
307(4). Buyers receive the most protection against future advances, and competing secured parties the
least, with lien creditors occupying an intermediate position between the two.
I suppose the 1972 amendments should be applauded for clearing up three knotty future advance
priority issues left over from the 1962 Code. But, by way of drafting history, that was not the driving
consideration behind the three provisions added. In fact, § 9-301(4) was adopted to capitalize on 26
U.S.C. § 6323 (1988), the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. For further discussion, see Carlson &
Shupack, supra note 18, at 420-21; and Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 18, at 349-52. For an extended
discussion of the Act and lien priorities generally, see William T. Plumb, Federal Liens and
Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 YALE L.. 228 (1967). The most thorough treatment of the
Act is provided in WILLIAM T. PLUMB, FEDERAL TAX LiENs (3d ed. 1972). For a discussion of the
Act's relationship to Article 9, see Coogan, Federal Tax Lien Act, supra note 41. For an article devoted
exclusively to § 6323 as it relates to § 9-301(4), see Edward Dauer & David Stem, U.C.C. § 9-301(4)
[1972] vs. IRC § 6323(c)(1)(A)(ii) [1966], 8 U. TOL. L. REv. 51 (1976).
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resolved for the better is open to argument.)" More important for present
purposes, if the future advance priority dispute was resolved, the conceptual
dispute over the nature of the security interest, I am convinced, was not.4'
It lingered to fluster discourse upon priority issues raised in the context of
future nonadvance obligations, testimony to the fact that such questions are
rarely put to rest permanently.
B. Future Nonadvance Obligations
Future nonadvance obligation is the term from the literature46 to describe
44. Dauer and Stem argue that U.C.C. § 9-310(4) (1972) is flawed in that it falls short of the level
of priority allowed secured parties under the Federal Tax Lien Act. Dauer & Stem, supra note 43, at
61. But see Carlson & Shupack, supra note 18, at 351-52 (arguing that § 9-301(4) goes too far in
protecting discretionary advances).
45. Compare Flechtner, supra note 18, at 727 n.143 with Carlson & Shupack, supra note 18, at
347 n.255 and Carlson & Schroeder, supra note 18, at 418, for the argument that the 1972 Amendments
adopted Coogan's multiple view. Certainly, the provision does not adopt the multiple view expressly.
Nor are we driven inescapably to that conclusion by anything the provision necessarily implies. To the
extent a lien creditor prevails under some circumstances, U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (1990) is unarguably
consistent with Coogan's characterization. But to the extent it awards priority to future advance lenders,
it is equally consistent with Gilmore's conceptualization (and it is to a very large extent indeed, see
supra note 43).
In short, the 1972 Amendments did not, in my estimation, institutionalize either Gilmore's or
Coogan's metaphor. However, it may be that priority disputes, like the one presented in the context of
future advances, might be resolved one by one; every possible variation cannot be anticipated, and the
question of whether a concept of the security interest has been established statutorily can thus be an
important one. See also infra Part IV.
46. See, e.g., Julian B. McDonnell, The Priority of Future Advances and Other Future Obligations
Under the RevisedArticle 9, in IC SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ch. 21B, §§ 21B.02[6][b], 21B.04 (Peter F. Coogan et al. eds., 1994); Julian B. McDonnell, The
Floating Lien Revisited: The Journey Continues, in IA id., ch. 7, § 7.04[3][b]; Schroeder & Carlson,
supra note 18, at 419. The term also appears in the leading case on the nonadvances, Dick Warner
Cargo Handling Corp. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 746 F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1984). One
commentator characterizes nonadvance obligations as "floating debt," underscoring those features
nonadvance obligations share with floating liens. See Jack B. Justice, Secured Transactions-What
Floats Can Be Sunk, 24 VILL. L. REv. 867, 896 (1979).
In UNI Imports, Inc. v. Aparacor, Inc., 978 F.2d 984 (7th Cir. 1992), the Seventh Circuit announced
that, were the Illinois state courts to rule on the matter, they would follow Dick Warner Cargo to the
effect that § 9-301(4) does not apply to limit priority of future nonadvance obligations. At the same
time, in UNI Imports the court found that the security agreement on the basis of which the secured party
claimed priority for its nonadvances against an intervening lien creditor had expired at the time of levy.
The court left "for another day the question whether a secured creditor is entitled to priority for
obligations incurred in connection with postlien advances paid out within 45 days of the levying of a
judgment lien that are made pursuant to an unexpired agreement." 978 F.2d at 992 n.6. It is worth
mentioning that, notwithstanding the endorsement of Dick Warner Cargo by the Permanent Editorial
Board, see infra note 64, the Seventh Circuit seemed to find the result in Dick Warner Cargo less than
convincing, 978 F.2d at 990, and ironic, id. at 991.
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an obligation owed a secured creditor not associated with an extension of
capital, credit, or other value advanced directly to the debtor.4" Nonadvance
obligations might include, for example, debt stemming from interest,48 from
transaction commitment fee obligations,49 or from collection and foreclosure
costs to a creditor that attend a debtor's default. Future nonadvance
obligations may be certain, as in the case of interest, or contingent, as in
the case of costs associated with collection,5" but in either event they are
future in the sense that they arise after the initial obligations imposed by
the security agreement.5'
Suppose that on January 1 Bank and Debtor come to terms in a loan
agreement which includes all the usual documents, among them a security
agreement that gives Bank a security interest in Debtor's inventory and
receivables. The security agreement provides that, should Bank be
compelled to defend its claim to the collateral against the claims of third
47. Article 9 allows for the securing of both payment obligations and performance obligations. See
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1990). Performance obligations might include a duty to insure the collateral against
loss, restrictions against absolute or security transfers, and a duty to maintain the collateral. A host of
other performance obligations might be secured as well, from covenants not to compete to performance
of sales and exclusive distribution contracts. See, e.g., John Miller Supply Co. v. Western State Bank,
199 N.W.2d 161 (Wis. 1972) (requiring evidence of parties' intent or course of dealing to find future
contingent liability on executory contracts to be covered by security agreement). One commentator has
remarked that "[a]lthough the Code and commentators have spent much effort on classifying types of
collateral, they have not worried much about the taxonomy of secured obligations." Campbell, supra
note 22, at 1066.
In Article 9, one kind of nonadvance obligation, that associated with recovering collateral-related
expenses as a part of the secured debt, gets explicit treatment. The provision, U.C.C. § 9-207 (1990),
applies only upon the secured party's coming into possession of the collateral, whether before default
(in the case of pledge) or after (in the case of foreclosure on default of an obligation secured by a
nonpossessory security interest). In either case "reasonable expenses" (including the cost of any
insurance and payment of taxes or other charges) of preserving and maintaining the collateral are
annexed to the secured obligation.
48. See, e.g., Dick Warner Cargo, 746 F.2d at 127; First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Security Nat'l
Bank, 676 P.2d 837, 839 (Okla. 1984). Dick Warner Cargo is the leading case on future nonadvance
obligations. See also infra note 52 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Dick Warner Cargo, 746 F.2d at 128.
50. See, e.g., In re Midas Coin Co., 264 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Mo. 1967) (holding that debtor's
obligation to repay overdrafts in its checking account was a secured obligation), affdper curian sub
noma. Zuke v. St. Johns Community Bank, 387 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1968).
51. Unsecured nonadvance (arguably) obligations also find their way to secured status by
assignment in either of two ways. First, unsecured claims might be assigned to a secured party. Second,
the secured creditor might assign its security interest to an otherwise unsecured creditor. For an in-depth
discussion, see Flechtner, supra note 18, at 697-98. For an earlier treatment of assignments that convert
unsecured obligations to secured debt, see Charles A. Shanor, A New Deal for Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 28 EMORY L.J. 587, 607 (1979). Nonadvance obligations converted from unsecured to
secured debt as voidable preferences are considered infra Part IV.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss4/4
FUTURE NONADVANCE OBLIGATIONS
parties, the resulting costs become an obligation of Debtor, and that
Debtor's performance of the obligation will be secured by the same
collateral as secures the principal debt attributable to the extension of
credit.
Consider now that Trade Creditor, a supplier of raw materials necessary
to Debtor in fabricating its inventory, goes unpaid, sues to judgment, and
procures a lien on June 1. Thereafter, Bank is compelled to defend its
security interest against a third party and, although successful, incurs
substantial defense costs that are certain in amount as of July 1.52 The costs
are spontaneously annexed to the secured obligation for which the collateral
is liable. 3
Meanwhile, Trade Creditor has levied on Debtor's inventory and
receivables. The value of the collateral proves insufficient to discharge all
three obligations-the debts due from the initial advance, Trade Creditor's
lien, and Bank's defense costs-in full. Bank's prior access to the collateral
to satisfy the initial advance is not open to argument,54 but it remains to be
52. The illustration is roughly abstracted from the leading, and somewhat controversial case, Dick
Warner Cargo, 746 F.2d at 127. After being batted back and forth between the district court and Second
Circuit, the case ultimately became a new battleground for the Coogan-Gilmore debate. It found
resolution at the hands of Judge Friendly, who, adopting Gilmore's unitary view, concluded that Aetna's
attorney's fees, paid after Warner's lien had attached, were nevertheless prior to Warner's claim. Id. at
134. Aetna's claim was prior because a single security interest was created and perfected before Warner
became a lien creditor. Warner's garnishment was dismissed. See Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 18,
at 426-30. For a detailed discussion of the particulars of the financing arrangement in that case, see id.
at 414-16. See also Flechtner, supra note 18, at 698-701.
In its intermediate stages, before final resolution in the Second Circuit, Dick Warner Cargo was the
subject of extensive discussion by Professors Carlson and Shupack. See Carlson & Shupack, supra note
18, at 359. In a comprehensive account of the Code provisions implicated, their extended textual
analysis led them to conclude that Aetna's postlien expenses should be subordinated to Warner's claim.
See id. at 362. Judge Friendly's subsequent ruling in favor of Aetna on the point received a stinging
critique by Professors Schroeder and Carlson in an equally thoughtful article. See Schroeder & Carlson,
supra note 18, at 426-35. The two articles taken together are the definitive conventional treatment of
the case and the issues it raises.
But also worthy of note is Professor McDonnell's discussion of the case and associated issues. See
McDonnell, supra note 46, § 21B.04[l]. While not as extensive as the two articles noted above, his
discussion offers a well-considered alternative treatment that drives him to adopt a position in accord
with Dick Warner Cargo.
53. As between a secured party and its debtor, the affixing of any obligation, initially at least, is
not a matter of priority or perfection, but of creation and validity. The annexing of obligations resulting
from future advances and "other value" is expressly authorized by U.C.C. § 9-204(3) (1990). For a
discussion of the statutory (Code) authority for advance and "other value" and its preCode roots in real
property law, see Campbell, supra note 22, at 1021-26.
54. That priority question involves only a routine application of U.C.C. § 9-301(I)(b) (1990),
which, by its negative implication, grants priority to the secured party under whichever view, Gilmore's
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decided whether the residual value of the collateral is to be distributed in
satisfaction of the secured nonadvance obligation or the lien.
It is evident that the squeeze-out of the lien creditor is no less an
eventuality of the nonadvance transaction than it is of the future advance
obligation." The effect for the lien creditor is identical: if Bank is permitted
to satisfy all the obligations provided for in the security agreement, the
ensuing nonadvance obligation from Bank's defense costs consumes
Debtor's equity in the inventory as surely as an obligation occasioned by
future advances made subsequent to a judgment lien. The normative
priority question raised is also identical: should the secured party be
permitted to satisfy the postlien, nonadvance obligation out of the collateral,
leaving nothing of the debtor's equity for the lienholder?
The U.C.C. does not mention nonadvance obligations as such,56 although
it is likely the drafters believed them to be the proper subject of an Article
9 security interest. 7 What they believed about the priority position of
or Coogan's, one happens to hold.
55. "In fact, the squeeze-out danger is greater in the case of nonadvances, since the secured party
can harm the intervening third party by incurring collection costs without the collusion of the debtor
[whereas the debtor would be involved in the decision to increase the secured obligation through
additional advances] or without any counteracting benefit to the debtor and its other creditors."
Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 18, at 430.
56. For that matter, before the 1972 Amendments added U.C.C. § 9-301(4), § 9-312(5) (priority
of future advances where the competing claimants are both Article 9 secured parties), and § 9-307(3)
(priority of future advances where another purchases the collateral), the Code had little to say about
future advances.
U.C.C. § 9-204(3) (1990) does expressly authorize the securing of obligations from future advances
or other value given, but future nonadvances involve no distinct exchange of value apart from that
giving rise to the original, primary obligation. Gilmore, the principal drafter of Article 9, indicates tacit
approval of nonadvance obligations, provided they are related to the original advance of value. See 2
Gilmore, supra note 19, at 920, 932. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1990) defines security interest as an interest
that secures payment or performance of an obligation without further requirement that the obligation
arise out of an advance of value. The definition is arguable if not certain statutory authority for the
securing of nonadvance obligations.
The Coogan-Gilmore debate never explicitly addressed itself to nonadvance obligations, although
Gilmore condemned the use of so-called "dragnet clauses" in some cases. See 2 GILMORE, supra note
19, at 932; see also Carlson & Shupack, supra note 18, at 356 n.295 (stating that while "he did not
focus on the matter, Professor Gilmore confounded future 'advances' and future 'other value").
57. As with future advance arrangements, there is a body of literature addressing nonadvance
obligations under preCode real estate and chattel mortgage law. Of primary concern to that literature
and in the cases was the so-called "dragnet clause" or "anaconda mortgage." In the usual sort of
controversy, the agreement between the mortgagor and mortgagee would provide that all indebtedness
of the mortgagee, whatever its nature and whenever arising, would be secured by the mortgage without
regard for the relationship, or lack of relationship, of the indebtedness to the original obligation. See,
e.g., Berger v. Fuller, 21 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Ark. 1929).
Courts disfavored dragnet clauses and responded to them with strict construction against mortgagees
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secured nonadvance obligations relative to intervening judgment liens is
unknown, or at least unclear." In any event, the issue of distributive
priorities and future nonadvances revived the Coogan-Gilmore debate, a
reminder that such matters are rarely put to rest permanently. Opposing
positions taken on the priority issue divide neatly along the lines of the
unitary and multiple views.
If analysis begins with the unitary view, priority clearly belongs to the
secured creditor, with the lien creditor squeezed out by postlien,
nonadvance obligations. The race to priority begins and ends with the
creation and perfection of the security interest, and, with all other
conditions met, all that is required for a perfected security interest is that
value at some point be given. While the security interest may evolve into
something quite different in its contours as advance and nonadvance
obligations are harvested, it is the very same security interest, perfected and
therefore prior from the time it first arose.
It seems then that the multiple view must deny priority to postlien
nonadvance obligations. On the conceptual level, however, the route to that
conclusion is less clear than it is in the case of future advance obligations.
For Coogan, the secured creditor accumulates as many perfected security
who drafted them, refusing to recognize antecedent debts as secured unless identified with specificity
in the agreement of the parties, and recognizing subsequent debts only when so related to the primary
obligation secured as to invite inference of consent by the mortgagor. See National Bank of Eastern
Arkansas v. Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Ark. 1959), aff'd sub nom. National Bank of Eastern
Arkansas v. General Mills, Inc., 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960).
A thoroughgoing discussion and critique of the same-relatedness test can be found in Campbell,
supra note 22, at 1040-55. Cases discussing dragnet clauses are assembled in Annotation, Debts
Included in Provision of Mortgage Purporting to Cover Unspecified Future or Existing Debts ("Dragnet
Clauses"), 172 A.L.R. 1079 (1948), and Milton Roberts, Annotation, Debts Included in Provision of
Mortgage Purporting to Cover All Future and Existing Debts (Dragnet Clause)-Modern Status, 3
A.L.R. 4th 690 (1981). See generally Flechtner, supra note 18.
58. Professors Schroeder and Carlson offer three possible explanations for the lack of treatment
of nonadvance priority by the Article 9 Review Committee assigned the task of drafting the 1972
Amendments. First, they propose, the Committee might simply have overlooked the matter, but assumed
Coogan's multiple theory applied to future advances, while Gilmore's unitary theory applied to
nonadvance obligations. This they reject, in part on the grounds that the "assumption does not take into
account the fondness of the Article 9 drafters for formal purity." Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 18,
at 422. Next, they suggest the possibility that, while nonadvance obligations were overlooked, the
Review Committee would, should the question be put to it, answer that the multiple theory applies to
all aspects of the obligation secured, a possibility which, if nothing else, "at least accords formalist
integrity to the drafting committee." Id. at 423.
Finally, and this is the explanation they find most plausible, the drafters did not overlook
nonadvance obligations; rather, they began with the presumption that the multiple theory defined the
security interest in all cases, but carved out an exception for certain future advances in § 9-301(4). Id.
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interests as it makes advances; consequently, there are as many races to
priority as there are security interests. The same could be said of future
nonadvance obligations, with the priority position of each obligation
similarly determined by the point at which a nonadvance obligation arises
relative to a competing lien." But it is value that is required for attachment,
and while future advances are undeniably value, it would seem that most
nonadvances are not.6
To find individuated security interests perfected at intervals of
nonadvance obligations is therefore something of an odd notion. It entails
the conflation of the two concepts, the future advance and the future
nonadvance, into a single conceptual category: value given. However that
may be, the multiple view is regarded to entail that nonadvance obligations
incurred future of a creditor's lien are later finishers in the race to priority
and, accordingly, must be subordinated to the rights of the lien creditor.
Leaving aside the conceptual lapse in the multiple view, when the
Coogan-Gilmore debate is relocated in the context of future nonadvance
transactions, Gilmore's enriched estate reply cannot stand. Gilmore was
willing to tolerate lien creditor squeeze-out by future advances on the
59. This is the view taken by Professors Schroeder and Carlson, see supra note 18, at 434-35, and
Professors Carlson and Shupack, see supra note 18, at 368-70.
60. Professors Carlson and Shupack state that interest, costs of preserving collateral, and costs of
collection are by no means future advances, but are instead the "other value" of which § 9-204(3)
speaks. Carlson & Shupack, supra note 18, at 354, 356 n.292. Because a security interest cannot attach,
and cannot, therefore, become perfected until value is given, there can be no perfected security interest
as to future nonadvances until the nonadvance value out of which they arise is given. Id.
Certainly, interest, costs of preserving collateral borne by the secured party, collection costs arising
on default, and attorney's fees do not fit comfortably within the term "advance," which, while not
expressly defined in the Code, certainly seems to "connote ... an affirmative transfer of funds to the
debtor." Carlson & Shupack, supra note 18, at 354. Whether this same provision authorizes the
annexing of such obligations as attorney's fees, interest, and the like turns on the generosity with which
one is willing to define the term "other value." Interest, the cost of using another's money for a time,
and costs of preserving the collateral borne by a secured party in possession, are arguably accommodat-
ed by the definition of value in § 1-201(44) without much struggle. Interest is the subject of express
treatment in § 9-504(l)(a), collection costs in the case of the secured party in possession is the express
topic of § 9-207(2). Both can be taken as something of value conferred upon the debtor. Carlson &
Shupack, supra note 18, at 353.
Finding interest, collections costs, and so forth to be other future value brings them within § 9-
204(3). If they are not, it remains clear that obligations arising out of such expenditures are, in any
event, obligations that can be safeguarded with an Article 9 security interest. See supra notes 47, 51
and accompanying text. So far as the debtor, liable in either case, is concerned, whether nonadvance
obligations are authorized under § 9-204(3) as debts from advances of "other value," or whether they
are authorized elsewhere as simply a kind of obligation that can be secured is a matter of indifference.
The characterization is dispositive where a secured party and lien creditor compete for the same
collateral.
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grounds that depletion of the debtor's estate is offset by the future advances
themselves. Despite their inability to reach the collateral subject to the
security interest, lien creditors would have recourse to the debtor's
remaining property, now presumably enhanced by the advances, to satisfy
their claims. But the rationale fails conspicuously where erosion of the
debtor's equity is attributable to nonadvance obligations annexed to the
secured debt to be treated as one with the principal obligation." In such
cases the estate "receives" only nonadvance "value."
The failure of the enriched estate argument to justify squeeze-out under
the conditions created by future nonadvance obligations has been docu-
mented in the literature and argues powerfully against the unitary view.62
Nevertheless, the unitary view triumphed in the leading case on the
question" and has since been endorsed by the Permanent Editorial
Board.64 Are we to surmise from these inroads that the multiple view is
somehow wrongheaded, an incorrect conceptualization of the security
interest, whereas the unitary view describes its true nature?
Further discussion of the unitary and multiple views on such terms is
unlikely to add fresh insight. I propose instead to explore the matter at a
different level of discourse, using the analysis suggested by recent work in
cognitive theory which emphasizes the significance of metaphor in rational
thought.
II. THE ROLE OF METAPHOR IN HUMAN COGNITION
A. The Objectivist Tradition
It is no revelation to remark that we act and interact with our environ-
ment as dictated by our thought processes, by the conceptual systems we
bring to experience. But how do our concepts arise? What engenders them?
And, however they arise and whatever their source, what do our concepts
represent? Are they imaginative structures by which experience is forcibly
ordered for our own ends, or are they abstract likenesses of an external
objective reality, such that a concept is true when it is a faithful representa-
tion of that reality, but false otherwise?
The latter notion is one of a number of related epistemological
61. See Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 18, at 433.
62. See, e.g., id. at 434-35; Carlson & Shupack, supra note 18, at 368-70.
63. See Dick Warner Cargo Handling Corp. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 746 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.
1984); see also UNI Imports, Inc. v. Aparacor, Inc., 978 F.2d 984 (7th Cir. 1992).
64. See U.C.C. § 9-301(4) cmt. 8 (1990), PEB Commentary No. 2, 3B U.L.A. 606 (1990).
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convictions held in common by philosophical positions that might
collectively be referred to as Objectivism.65 Objectivism posits that the
world consists of objects, events, and phenomena innately possessed of
various properties standing in certain relation to one another. These sets of
conditions occur naturally in the world external to cognitive processes; they
are, so to say, mind-independent.66
65. The term "Objectivism" does not identify a particular school of thought in philosophy or
elsewhere. It is used here in the sense given it by Bemstein to refer to a set of assumptions that define
a general view of the world, thought, language, and meaning: "By 'objectivism,' I mean the basic
conviction that there must be some permanent, a historical matrix or framework to which we can
ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality or goodness or
rightness." RICHARD BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM 8 (1983). This is the sense
in which Johnson and Lakoff use the term. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note I, at 196. Professor Winter
summarizes Objectivism in terms of three fundamental themes:
First, [Objectivism] treats the world as filled with determinate, mind-independent objects with
inherent characteristics unrelated to human interactions. Second, it understands categorization
either as about natural sets of objects in the world or, when it recognizes categorization as
humanly constructed, as about objects with ascertainable properties or criteria that establish
their commonality. Finally, it treats reasoning as about propositions and principles that are
capable of "mirroring" those objects and accurately describing their properties and relations.
Winter, supra note 4, at 1108. Objectivist presumptions and their evolution are discussed and critiqued
at length in RIcHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATuRE (1979). Objectivist themes
in recent theories of semantics are surveyed in JOHNSON, supra note 1, at xxix-xxxv (discussing
Objectivist notions at work in Model-theoretic Semantics, Situation Semantics and other influential
theories of meaning). Objectivism has various familiar instantiations, including metaphysical realism
and formalism. See infra note 66.
Objectivism may also be understood as the antithesis of subjectivism and radical relativism, which,
in the interest of convenience, I treat here as one. Where objectivism has it that properties, relations,
categories, and structures occur naturally, subjectivism holds that these are entirely relative to the
purposes and conceptual systems of the reasoner, and that such constructs vary infinitely across cultures
and over time. See LAKOFF AND JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 224. On the subjectivist view, reality is very
much an individual matter. For a summary account contrasting the objectivist and subjectivist theories,
see id. at 185-92.
There is, of course, no single brand of subjectivism or relativism, but countless versions varying
from what I have referred to as radical relativism. Even Whorf, "the most celebrated relativist of this
century," was not a radical relativist. LAKOFF, supra note 1, at 304.
66. Thus, my desk has a front, back, top, and bottom whether or not I have the good sense to
appreciate those existential relationships among its parts. The philosophical context of Objectivism is
neatly summarized in JOHNSON, supra note 1, at xxv-xxix; LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 184-
94; LAKoFF, supra note 1, at 8-16.
Objectivist presumptions about reality beat a path to a predictable view of knowledge, reason,
language, and meaning, that is, to a predictable epistemology. Standing as it does on an extemalist view
of the world, Objectivism presupposes the possibility of a uniquely correct, God's-eye perspective
which, were we able to escape human circumstances-our physiological and cultural constraints-long
enough to adopt it, would reward us with correct, uncluttered knowledge of reality.
Knowledge, then, transcends human thought processes, and the task of cognition in acquiring
knowledge is to identify, abstract, and translate objective reality into conforming mental constructs or
concepts. Concepts of the correct sort are symbolic analogues wherein reality is directly embalmed, and
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To think our way to unmediated concepts, it is incumbent upon us to
purge the cognitive act of physiological, cultural, and other confounding
influences that threaten to infect reason.6' Implicit in these convictions is
that reason, pure reason, is disembodied in the sense that it cannot be
reached from a beginning point of adulterating perceptions," emotions, or
imagination. The latter are aspects of human cognition, but they introduce
distinctly human agencies into cognitive processing, and knowledge of the
kind to which they lead is inescapably mediate. They are best quarantined
somewhere in the extra-rational quarters of the cognitive apparatus.69
These convictions are strikingly illustrated in the Objectivist position on
conceptual categories. We categorize all manner of entities, events,
activities, and situations continually as part of our fundamental reasoning
processes, although much categorizing is undertaken unconsciously." On
the Objectivist account, categories of the mind are, or ought to be if they
they are instances of reason insofar as they have been liberated from subjective influences that
contaminate knowledge. See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at xxiv-xxv; see also LAKOFF, supra note 1, at
173.
These are the salient features of what Professor Moore refers to as "metaphysical" (as distinguished
from "legal") realism. See Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the
Morse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871, 881-90 (1989).
67. Lakoff characterizes Objectivism on this particular in the following way: "If human beings are
to have real knowledge, then the idiosyncracies of human organisms had better not get in the way." So
that, "[w]hat the human body does not do, on the Objectivist account, is add anything essential to
concepts that does not correspond to what is objectively present in the structure of the world." LAKOFF,
supra note 1, at 174.
68. Objectivism allows that the perceptual apparatus is the source of information about the external
world necessary to establishing correspondences between reality and the symbols that comprise our
conceptual systems. Our perceptual mechanisms, however, are imperfect. On the one hand, there is
some knowledge that is simply outside the perceptual capacity to capture and transmit, and, on the
other, our perceptions may simply mislead or deceive us. Id. at 174.
69. Reasoning to immediate knowledge must proceed from our purely rational side which
interposes nothing between concepts and direct knowledge of external reality. On the Objectivist view,
rationality is essentially disembodied; it consists of pure abstract logical relations independent
of subjective processes in the reasoner's mind. It is usually granted that images, metaphorical
projections, and analogical leaps may be part of our mental processes.... But such cognitive
processes are regarded by objectivists as mere 'psychological' processes irrelevant to the
logical reconstruction and evaluation of rational judgments.
JOHNSON, supra note I, at xxiv. Rationality for the Objectivist is transcendental, in keeping with
Objectivist metaphysics, such that "correct reason is viewed [by the Objectivists] as symbol, symbol-
manipulation that accurately mirrors the rational structure of the world." LAKOFF, supra note 1, at 175.
70. As Lakoff puts it, "[c]ategorization is not a matter to be taken lightly. There is nothing more
basic to our thought, perception, action, and speech." LAKOFF, supra note 1, at 5. For example, "[elvery
time we see something as a kind of thing ... we are categorizing. Whenever we reason about kinds of
things.., we are employing categories. Whenever we intentionally perform any kind of action... we
are using categories." Id. at 5-6.
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are to be taken seriously, representations of categories as they are in the
world, and categories in the world are defined by necessary and sufficient
properties.7' A thing is either P or not P by virtue of the inherent features
it shares (or does not share) with other category members.72
For the Objectivist, then, cognition is algorithmic, and concepts depend
for correctness upon the correspondence of the symbols they employ to the
realities they presume to represent. From this, two particularly repressive
inferences follow. First, knowledge of the world is not relative to human
goals and purposes, but is indifferent to them. Second, reasoning to
knowledge cannot implicate imaginative aspects of human cognition, which
belong to the nonrational side of our nature.
One such imaginative device is metaphor,73 a term used here not in the
popular sense of the rhetorical artifice, but in a much broader sense to
include metaphoric concepts. Metaphoric concepts are those fashioned or
modeled on another and different concept. 74 For example, when I reason
about the concept time, I may for my own purposes come to regard it as
71. This is the classical theory of categories. In fact, this view of categories has never really been
thought of as a theory; rather, it has been an empirical given. Id. at 6.
72. Assigning, from experience, something membership in a conceptual category is an exercise
in identifying necessary and sufficient conditions of membership that define the category as it is out
there. The conditions themselves, together with the category they define, are existentially determinate.
The degree to which a conceptual category accurately imparts knowledge can be directly measured
against external reality. That category membership can be empirically confirmed or refuted because
properties necessary and sufficient for membership have ontological status in the external world
irrespective of human concepts. Of course, this leaves little room for the influences of human conceptual
systems, and "strongly constrains what categories of the mind can be like." LAKOFF, supra note 1, at
165. See also Moore, supra note 66, at 878-79 (discussing strong and diluted versions of metaphysical
realism).
73. "In the objectivist tradition, metaphor is of marginal interest at best, and it is excluded
altogether from the study of semantics (objective meaning). It is seen as only marginally relevant to an
account of truth." LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 210. That Objectivism holds metaphor in low
regard is predictable from Objectivist ontology and epistemology. Concepts are established by symbol
manipulation to reach literal correspondence to external conditions. Metaphor cuts across the boundaries
of experience to state a relationship between experiences from different domains, projecting the
elements from one domain to another and asserting a meaningful correspondence between them. In
postulating an identity between different domains of experience, metaphoric structures deny the
Objectivist assumptions of a reality defined by fixed, mind-independent properties, relations, and
categories. See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 66-67. See also Michael S. Moore, The Semantics ofJudging,
54 S. CAL. L. REv. 151, 188-92 (1981), for a brief discussion of metaphor, the problems it raises for
the Objectivist tenets of formalism, and its significance in legal analysis.
Metaphor is also threatening to the Objectivist tradition because of its roots in the imagination which
might "lead us away from the truth and toward illusion." LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 191.
See also infra note 78. Traditional jurisprudence shares this distrust of metaphor. See infra note 81.
74. For an Experientialist definition of metaphor, see supra note 1.
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a valuable commodity or resource and might remark under various
circumstances that it has been saved, wasted, squandered, or well spent.
An imaginative construct confounded with purpose, the metaphoric concept,
time is a resource, contributes nothing in the way of knowledge." In short,
Objectivist postulates brook no active role for human understanding in
structuring reality.76
Objectivist metaphysics is not merely the stuff of debate among erudite
philosophers. Objectivist postulates, in one form or another, have
dominated occidental intellectual activity for two thousand years.77 The
philosophy of external realism that characterizes Objectivism so far
pervades our pursuits that it has been the unstated beginning point in
virtually every aspect of the human endeavor from philosophy to mathemat-
ics.7 8 There are few provinces that have not been invaded by Objectivist
75. Under Objectivist rule, metaphorical devices are thus relegated to the domain of the poetic and
rhetorical where it is irrelevant that they distort rather than define reality. See LAKOFF, supra note 1,
at 165-66. For a brief but enlightening discussion of the views of Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, and others
on metaphor, see LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 189-92. For a short history of theories of
imagination, beginning with the Platonic tradition and including a detailed discussion of Kant's insights,
see JOHNSON, supra note 1, ch. 6.
76. Anything not having to do with establishing objective correspondence must, by definition, be
excluded from cognitive operations. Imaginative aspects of the cognitive apparatus would introduce
nonobjective considerations into the process and contaminate a concept under construction. Johnson
summarizes the Objectivist view on imagination as follows:
[T]he conflation of reason with imagination can only lead to relativism.
A. [ nd, only by avoiding relativism can we] avoid a frightening indeterminacy in our
experience. There lurks in most of us a gnawing fear that, should Objectivism prove
untenable, the floodgates holding back the raging currents of relativism would be opened
forever. We would all drown in the ensuing chaotic inundation.
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 195, 198.
77. "The myth of objectivism has dominated Western culture, and in particular Western
philosophy, from the pre-Socratic to the present day. The view that we have access to absolute and
unconditional truths about the world is the cornerstone of the Western philosophical tradition." LAKOFF
& JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 195. For that matter, "the Greeks precluded us from even raising the kinds
of issues ... [the experientialists] wanted to address." Id. at ix.
The heritage in Western philosophy is traceable primarily to Descartes and Kant. Descartes was
devoted to the notion that knowledge must be founded on the certain. He also argued for a dichotomy
of the body and mind, such that rationality is essentially disembodied. See generally RENE DESCARTES,
Rules for the Direction of the Mind (1628), in 1 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WITINGS OF RENE DESCARTES
7 (John Cottingham et al. trans., 1985). Kant acknowledged a greater role for sense perceptions in the
acquisition of knowledge, but preserved a dichotomy between reason and bodily experience whereby
we may sometimes experience things "as they appear" instead of "as they are in themselves." See, e.g.,
JONATHAN BENNETT, KANT'S DIALECTIC 52 (1974); JONATHAN BENNETT, KANT'S ANALYTIC (1966).
78. For instance, "[m]athematics is commonly assumed to be transcendentally true-true of pure
mathematical entities in some abstract 'Platonic' realm. The existence of mathematical truth is
commonly taken as a demonstration that rationality is transcendental." LAKOFF, supra note 1, at 368.
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metaphysical precepts, and the law is by no means among those institutions
that have escaped their influence.
Conventional legal analysis is deeply rooted in the Objectivist tradi-
tion.79 Its methodology involves coaxing abstract principles from cases and
other legal authority, instituting the principles abstracted as propositions,
then reinstantiating the derived propositions in succeeding cases." Since the
In an intriguing treatment, Lakoff challenges Objectivist presumptions concerning mathematics as
transcendental and offers an Experientialist alternative view of the subject. Id. at 353-65.
For a fascinating critique of Objectivist metaphysics in the context of biological taxonomy, see Id.
at 185-95.
79. Of course, it has for some time been the subject of attack, launched in earlier times by
Llewellyn and his realists, and in more recent times by, for instance, the critical legal studies movement.
For a discussion of Llewellyn and the legal realists, see WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE
REALIST MOVEMENT (1973). Professor Moore has described contemporary postrealism as
"interpretivism," a brand ofanti-Objectivism that sets out to avoid any metaphysical debate as insoluble
and so deserving of no more scholarly attention: "An interpretivist is someone who claims not to have
a metaphysics or an epistemology because, she thinks, she does not need them for the activity in which
she wishes to engage, namely, interpretation." Moore, supra note 66, at 890. Illustrative of the
interpretive philosophy is the work of Richard Rorty. Id. at 893. Illustrative of the interpretivist position
in legal theory is the work of Stanley Fish, Robert Cover, and Ronald Dworkin, in descending order
of ambitious adherence to interpretivist principles. Id. at 891-92.
In any case, Externalist principles-the principles of Objectivism expressed as formalism in
jurisprudence--seem to have survived the attacks. See infra note 80.
80. "The formalist theory of adjudication asserts that legal disputes can be . . . resolved by
recourse to legal rules and principles, and the facts of each particular dispute." A formalist judge
deduces a decision from these two sources alone. Moore, supra note 73, at 155.
Notwithstanding the fact that formalism has often been an easy target of attack in the literature, see,
e.g., Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908), Professor Moore makes
the case that formalism is "far from dead," and identifies and discusses recent incarnations. Moore,
supra note 73, at 163, 165-67. Professor Winter identifies Objectivist postulates at work in, for example,
RONALD DWORKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1977); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100
HARV. L. REv. 781, 783 (1987); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 15 (1959); and even in the otherwise anti-Objectivist position taken in Mark V.
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96
HARV. L. REV. 781, 804 (1983). See Winter, supra note 4, at 1109 n.8.
Formalism, and with it, a host of consistent Objectivist tenets, were powerfully revitalized in recent
times with the introduction of economic analysis in the law by Judge Posner. See, e.g., RICHARD
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (4th ed. 1992), reviewed in Arthur Allen Leff, Economic
Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974) (criticizing the book
for its single-mindedness). Cf. Moore, supra note 73, at 165. Posner-inspired analysis of commercial
law generally, and bankruptcy particularly, has been at the center of scholarly discourse on those
subjects for more than ten years. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured
Financing Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1183 (1979); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-
Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditor's Bargain, 91 YALE L.L 857 (1982); Douglas G. Baird, Loss
Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CtI. L. REv,. 815 (1987),
to name only a few of the earlier works. However fashionable and well-represented in the scholarly
journals, the scholarship of law and economics has been the subject of sustained criticism. Two of its
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propositions themselves transcend their concrete origins, the sense is that
they are susceptible of independent, objective application. Reasoning from
transcendent principles is therefore presumed to lead to value-neutral results
in individual cases, to results uncontaminated by the subjective impulses of
decisionmakers.8
This has been the analytic course of the Coogan-Gilmore debate. The
pattern has so far consisted of inducing the true nature of the security
interest from the textual materials of Article 9, adopting either the unitary
or multiple view on that basis, then stating the conclusion as an a priori
proposition decisive of future advance and nonadvance priority issues.
B. An End to the Tyranny of Objectivist Epistemology: Experiential
Realism
As mentioned in the introduction to the present treatment, there has
recently emerged a school of thought, denominated experiential realism
(Experientialism) by its authors, 2 that has come to regard metaphor as
primary in cognition.83 En route to that conclusion, Experientialism refutes
to incredulity the epistemological tenets associated with the Objectivist
tradition. Whereas Objectivism holds that structures, categories, sets, and
models are a priori features of external reality, Experientialism discards
once and for all the notion that reality is naturally organized according to
mind-independent constructs.
8 4
most active critics include Elizabeth Warren, see, e.g, Bankruptcy Policy, U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987),
and David Gray Carlson, see, e.g., Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1341 (1987);
Bankruptcy Theory and the Creditor's Bargain, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 453 (1992).
81. Given that traditional legal method operates on the basis of Objectivist metaphysical
presumptions, it is no surprise that "[m]uch legal thought assumes metaphors distort and that only
propositions and rigorous logic are proper bases of legal reason." Winter, supra note 4, at 1162.
Professor Winter provides an in-depth critique of Cohen's criticism of legal metaphor as "transcendental
nonsense" in the law. Id. at 1162-71. He catalogs the metaphors at the basis of Cohen's realistic and
rational substitutes for fictions and metaphors. The intent, however, is not to criticize Cohen, but, I
believe, to demonstrate emphatically his point that "[m]etaphor is inevitable in legal analysis because
it is central to human rationality; it is a primary mode of comprehension and reasoning." Id. at 1166.
See also Moore, supra note 73, at 188-92.
82. Experiential realism is the term used by Lakoff and Johnson to describe the new cognitive
theory they authored. See LAKOFF, supra note I, at xv.
83. "A metaphor is not merely a linguistic expression (a form of words) used for artistic or
rhetorical purposes; instead, it is a process of human understanding by which we achieve meaningful
experience that we can make sense of." JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 15.
84. "[O]bjectivist philosophy fails to account for the way we understand our experience, our
thoughts, and our language." LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 210. Lakoff argues that "all of the
objectivist doctrines concerning human thought and language are problematic if not downright wrong.
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On the Experientialist account, structures, categories,s 5 properties, and
relationships have no ontological status in the world external to cognitive
operations. Instead, those conditions owe their existence to human cognitive
processes. The structures and relations that we see in the external world of
experience are the fruits of cognitive efforts to structure and organize
experience in a meaningful way relevant to human purposes. Our concepts,
under the new order, do not symbolically incarcerate "slices of reality":
they are that reality.
Experientialism has made overwhelmingly the case that the principles by
which concepts are established are unqualifiedly imaginative 6 and
These arguments ... present problems for anyone who holds any of these doctrines." LAKOFF, supra
note 1, at 158. The central challenge is to Objectivist epistemology, but Experientialism refutes in part
Objectivist metaphysics as well. Id.
The Experientialist program does, however, share some common ground with the Objectivist
tradition, in that both assume a reality external to the human cognitive apparatus, a commitment to the
possibility of stable knowledge, and a rejection of the notion that one conceptual system is as good as
the next. Id. The principal distinction between Objectivism and Experientialism is that the form not only
assumes an external reality, but "assumes that reality is correctly and completely structured in a way
that can be modeled by set-theoretical models-that is, in terms of entities, properties, and relations."
Id. at 159. In this, Objectivism goes beyond basic realism.
Experientialism may thus be understood as occupying "a middle ground between Objectivism and
Relativism [radical relativism]" of the kind argued for by Rorty, Kuhn, or Bernstein. JOHNSON, supra
note 1, at 196. The philosophical stance of Experientialism owes a debt to Putnam's internal realism.
See LAKOt, supra note 1, at 266.
85. The basic claim is that categories are conceptual, defined not by inherent properties of objects
as the Objectivists would have it, but on the basis of interactional properties and prototypes, both of
which are a matter of human constructs as opposed to a priori properties. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON,
supra note 1, at 122-25.
On the Experientialist view, conceptual categories are built around complex combinations of
concepts (which may themselves be organized as an assemblage of structural metaphors) called
idealized cognitive models, or "ICMs." These models may be understood as folk theories by which a
category is defined. (This is, of course, in sharp contrast to the Objectivist view which sees categories
as defined by necessary and sufficient conditions.) Prototypes, or central category members, are
prototypical with reference to ICMs. Divergence from prototype yields either nonmembership, or,
perhaps, graded membership in the category. For an excellent example of the application of the
Experientialist theory of categories in jurisprudence, see Winter, supra note 4, at 1148-56.
86. "Without imagination, nothing in the world could be meaningful." JOHNSON, supra note 1, at
ix.
Another instrument of cognition is metonymy. In metonymy, one entity is taken to standfor another.
It differs from metaphor, which involves understanding one entity in terms of another. An example of
a special case of metonymy, called synecdoche (part stands for the whole) by grammarians, illustrates
the distinction. In the expression, "all hands on deck," the hands standfor the person. See Lakoff &
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 35-40. Metonymic models and their role in conceptual categories are
discussed at length throughout LAKOFF, supra note I.
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embodied.87 Perhaps the most pervasive and powerful imaginative device
is the capacity for metaphor,"8 the ability to fashion metaphoric concepts
briefly alluded to earlier. It is the capacity to structure a concept by
comparing aspects of experience from different domains to establish
conceptual correlations and analogies between them.
C. The New Place of Metaphor in Cognition
On the Experientialist view, only rudimentary concepts are directly
grasped from experience." A fundamental source of our concepts is the
kinesthetic image schematic structure, or image schema." Image schemas
emerge from recurring, recognizable patterns in experience, principally of
repeating patterns associated with our physical orientation in, and
interactions with, spatial reality, such as when we manipulate objects, move
about, and so forth. Because these patterns are repeating, they are
recognizable; otherwise, it would be impossible to function in the
87. By embodied, it is meant that concepts are grounded in preconceptual, physical experience,
and are not abstract representations of conditions immanent in experience. Knowledge, under the
Experientialist regime, transcends neither the reasoner nor the reasoning process. See JOHNSON, supra
note 1, at 206.
88. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 3. The claim of Experientialism, then, is that our
ordinary conceptual system is mainly metaphorical, that most concepts are understood in terms of
others. Id. at 56. "Metaphors are not merely convenient economies for expressing our knowledge; rather,
they are our knowledge... of the particular phenomena in question." JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 112.
89. By rudimentary, I mean concepts understood directly, without metaphor. These consist mainly
of the ubiquitous spatial concepts, such as up-down, verticality, and containment. LAKOFF & JOHNSON,
supra note 1, at 57.
Experience here refers both to our physical interactions with the external world and our social and
cultural interactions as well. Some aspects of experience are universal, while others are culture-specific.
Physical and cultural experiences are not isolated episodes, but are understood as experiential gestalts.
Some experiences are "natural kinds of experience" with natural emergent dimensions (e.g., parts,
stages, and so on) and are directly grasped on their own terms. Others lack natural dimensions and must
be grasped indirectly through metaphor. Id. at 120.
90. The Experientialist use of the term "schema" derives from Kant, who regarded schema as
nonpropositional, imaginative structures. See generally BENNETT, KANT'S ANALYTIC, supra note 77,
at 141-52, for an account of Kant's schematicism. The Experientialist position runs counter to
mainstream view on the nature of schemata. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 19. A detailed discussion of
Kant's understanding of image schema and its influence on the Experientialist view can be found in id.
at 147. Points of departure from Kant's understanding are discussed in id. at 156-65. For a detailed
account that locates the Experientialist view on image schema in the context of recent cognitive
research, see id. at 19-28.
91. Consider, for example, Johnson's description of the force schema:
We begin to grasp the meaning of physical force from the day we are born (or even before).
We have bodies that are acted upon by "external" and "internal" forces such as gravity, light,
heat, wind, bodily processes, and the obtrusion of other physical objects. Such interactions
constitute our first interaction with forces, and they reveal patterned recurring relations
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physical world about us.92 These repeating patterns become embodied as
image schematic concepts which, by virtue of their bodily basis, are
meaningful in the most fundamental way. 3
Image schemas, then, may be understood as generalizations or abstrac-
tions of recurring patterns in experience.94 As generalizations, they can be
projected onto other aspects of experience wherein salient dimensions of
the pattern are perceived. An illustration may prove helpful here. One of
the more pervasive image schemas so far identified (and, as it happens, one
central to the treatment of the Article 9 priority question that follows) is the
container schema.95 We conceive of our bodies as themselves containers
continually filled and emptied of the food we consume, the air we breathe,
the liquids we drink, and so on. Moreover, we experience things outside
ourselves as containers, as having an inside and an outside established by
some boundary, such that we regularly regard ourselves and other entities
as contained. From these regular and repeating patterns of containment
between ourselves and our environment. Such patterns develop as meaning structures through
which our world begins to exhibit a measure of coherence, regularity, and intelligibility.
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 13.
92. "If we are to experience our world as a connected and unified place that we can make sense
of, then there must be repeatable pattern and structure in our experiences. Image schemata are those
recurringstructures of or in, our perceptual interactions, bodily experiences, and cognitive operations."
Id. at 79.
93. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 57. The beginning point for reasoning about abstract
concepts, then, is the embodiment of experience, the kinds of physical experience common to human
beings because of our physical forms (e.g., we walk upright) as constrained by the physical environment
in which we find ourselves (e.g., we are located in a world with gravity, a certain topography and other
physical constants). See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 51.
94. Although generalizations, image schemas are not abstractions in the sense of propositions, "in
that they are not abstract subject-predicate structures... that specify truth conditions." JOHNSON, supra
note 1, at 23. That is, they do not identify an existing or natural set of relations between symbols and
a represented reality. Id. at 29.
95. Id. at 21. Several other image schemas have been identified and described. For example, there
is a part-whole schema, which has its bodily basis in our experiencing our bodies as unified wholes,
but also as structured by individuated constituent parts. This schema, with whole, part, and
configuration structural elements, leads to our understanding other objects in the world as having a
whole-part structure as well. The center-periphery schema is comprised of the structural elements, an
entity, center, and periphery, and has its bodily basis in our awareness of our bodies as consisting of
a center, tunk, and radiating peripheral appendages. Other image schemas include the up-down, linear
order, front-back, link and balance schemas. See generally LAKOFF, supra note I, at 272-75 (summa-
rizing the bodily basis and structural elements of these image schemas).
The balance schema is of special interest because of its role in structuring the concepts in Article
9, see infra Part lIm, as is the source-path-goal schema. The latter has its bodily basis in our physical
movements from one place to the next from a beginning point, along a path of contiguous locations in
a defined direction, to a point of destination. LAKOFF, supra note 1, at 275.
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experience emerges the container image schema.96
Directly comprehended image schematic concepts that emerge from
experience, like front-back and containment, are sharply delineated by their
natural dimensions. So that we may refer to and take action with respect to
the physical world in which we find ourselves, it proves useful to relocate
imaginatively, to project, the dimensions of our emergent concepts onto
other constituents in our physical environment. Accordingly, we speak of
being in the forest, or in the meadow, as though they are containers
inherently, when, in fact, there is no reason to suppose either forests or
meadows to be containers other than the convenience of so regarding them
for our own ends and understanding.97
Projecting emergent concepts from one aspect of physical experience to
another aspect of physical experience is, however, short of metaphor.
Projections of the sort discussed above deploy the structural elements of
image schema all within the physical domain. Metaphor, on the other hand,
involves the process by which concepts from one domain, called the source
domain, are employed to structure concepts from another, different domain,
called the target domain.9" In this way, sharply delineated concepts with
96. The container schema, like all image schemas, is an abstraction of the recurring pattern which
is its experiential basis. It is not a rich image. (For example, the container schema is not the same thing
as the mental image or picture of, say, furniture contained within the bounds of a room.) Rather, it is
a generality occupying a mental space and consists of a few basic parts or structural elements. For
instance, the container schema has the structural elements, interior, boundary, and exterior, LAKOFF,
supra note 1, at 272, which, taken together, form a gestalt that comprises the embodied pattern of the
image schema. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 41. Since it is a generality, the container schema can be
deployed across a range of experiences to organize and make them comprehensible where there is a
perceived fit of schematic structural elements. LAKOFF, supra note 1, at 272. For a detailed explication,
see JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 21-23.
97. We likewise conceive of our visual field as a container for the entities within it, as evidenced
by such expressions as "the ship is coming into view," "I have him in sight," and "I can't see him-a
tree is in the way." LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 30. Both conceptions, of course, are products
of our own physical orientation in the environment. We perceive ourselves as containers and project
that in-out orientation onto other physical objects around us. Id. at 29. It is important to recognize that
clearings in the woods, for instance, are not inherently containers. Rather, containment is a property "we
project onto it relative to the way we function with respect to it." Id. at 161.
98. To understand one thing in terms of another thing of the same kind involves projection.
However, to understand one thing in terms of another and different kind of thing involves metaphorical
projection. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 170-71. For example, to say, "the deer is behind the
boulder," is to project our own front-back orientation onto the boulder and the deer, i.e., to understand
one kind of physical thing (the boulder) in terms of another physical thing (the physical orientation of
our bodies). Because the projection occurs entirely within the physical domain, metaphor is not
implicated. To say, on the other hand, "inflation is on the rise," requires metaphor. inflation must be
understood as a physical substance, and to understand it as "rising" depends upon a projection of the
orientational metaphor, more is up, from the physical domain to the abstract domain wherein is located
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natural dimensions, like containment, center-periphery, and source-path-
goal,99 permit the structuring of concepts that are without natural dimen-
sions and are, therefore, ill-delineated." Thus, we are able to speak of (and
conceive of) someone as being "in trouble" or as being "in love" because
we have a concept of containment that emerges from the physical (source)
domain with which to structure and make meaningful the abstract concepts
trouble and love in the emotional (target) domain.''
The way in which we structure the concept time offers an especially
instructive illustration of these principles at work. Time is a concept
without natural dimensions of its own and so must be apprehended
indirectly through metaphor. This necessity is reflected in a variety of
expressions used in talking and reasoning about it. For example, expres-
sions like, "the time will come when," "the time is past," "the time is
approaching," and "we look forward to the time when," reveal the
underlying metaphor time is a moving object.1' 2
the concept of inflation on the rise. Id.
99. See supra notes 95-96 for a discussion of additional schemata.
100. The basic insight of Experientialism is that much of our experience must be understood
indirectly through metaphor. Concepts like emotions, various human institutions, and other abstractions
are experienced directly, but lack natural dimensions and cannot be understood directly. See LAKOFF
& JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 115.
101. This cross-conceptualization is possible because of the simple structure of image schemas, the
fact that they are comprised of a few basic parts and relations that may be metaphorically elaborated
across a wide range of experiential domains. Id. at 28.
For example, Johnson has shown that a wide variety of senses of the word "out" are connected as
metaphoric elaborations of the in-out and container image schemas. Consider the following nonspatial
senses of the term "out":
He told his story, leaving out none of the details.
He tried to get out of our contract.
The truth finally came out.
See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 34. All these senses are the product of metaphoric projection of image
schema from physical experience. Johnson states:
Numerous cases, such as leave out, pick out, take out, etc., can be either physical bodily
actions that involve orientational schemata, or else they can be metaphorically oriented mental
actions. What you pick out physically are spatially extended objects; what you pick out
metaphorically are abstract mental or logical entities. But the relevant preconceptual schema
is generally the same for both senses of picking out.
Id.
States, such as emotional states like love, trouble, depression, and health, are sometimes understood
as containers, LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 31-32, and sometimes as destinations.
102. The concept of objects moving across space from one point to the next metaphorically
structures the concept time, and expressions, such as "time flies," unavoidably follow suit as linguistic
realizations of this metaphoric concept. "Since metaphorical expressions in our language are tied to
metaphorical concepts in a systematic way, we can use metaphorical linguistic expressions to study the
nature of metaphorical concepts ... ." LAKoFF & JOHNSON, supra note I, at 7.
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The concept is partially structured by our experience of palpable objects
moving through physical space, the salient features of which are mapped
onto our experience of time, so that the well-delineated emergent concept
from the source domain (the experience of objects traversing physical
space) informs and structures the ill-delineated concept in the target domain
(our experience of the concept of time).t °3
A feature of metaphoric mapping merits attention here. When one
concept is modeled on another, epistemic knowledge about the source
domain is imported to the target domain. That is to say, metaphoric
mapping brings with it metaphoric entailments. Entailments can be
understood as the inferential consequences associated with the source
concept. For example, the container schema has the structural elements
interior, exterior, and boundary that emerge from the recurring experience
of physical containment. In the physical domain, there are a number of
consequences associated with boundedness: e.g., freedom of the thing
contained from physical forces outside the container; limitation of the
forces at work within the container; and fixing of the locus of the thing
contained. Those consequences--entailments-of containment implied by
the internal structure of the container image schema travel with it to the
target domain and provide the basis for rational inferences drawn about the
The concept of time is also partly defined by an orientational metaphor based on the front-back
image schema. Orientational metaphors are so-called because they are premised on image schemata that
emerge from patterns of spatial orientation recurring in physical experience (e.g., the emergent concepts
up-down, front-back, and near-far). Of course, these orientations are relative to correlates established
by the kinds of bodies we have; that is to say, our orientations are relative but not arbitrary.
Like other emergent concepts, orientational concepts are rooted in preconceptual experience and have
a bodily basis. For instance, the front-back schema emerges from our experiencing our bodies as having
fronts and backs relative to other entities in the physical world. Moving objects are given a front-back
orientation, with the status front awarded to that part of the object trained in the direction of motion.
Given that the concept time is partially structured by the time-is-a-moving-object metaphor, time is
likewise conceived as having a front-back orientation, as evidenced in expressions like "she faced the
future head-on," and "he cannot face tomorrow." The two metaphors cohere by virtue of their grounding
in the physical experience of objects and of objects moving through space. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON,
supra note 1, at 41-45.
This discussion by no means exhausts the ontological metaphors by which time is understood. For
example, time is understood to be a container (e.g., "she'll never make it in time," and "he can finish
the test in an hour"). See id. at 59.
103. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 7-9; see also id. at 41-44. The metaphoric mappings
by which the concept of time is partially structured are meaningful because the emergent concepts
employed are directly meaningful at the physical level. An indefinite concept like time is intelligible
because it can be understood in terms of ordered, highly delineated emergent concepts with crisp
dimensions. It can be understood and contended with, in other words, because of the human capacity
for metaphor.
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target domain. 4
Ontological metaphors"°5 (e.g., time is a moving object) are basic to our
conceptual system, but they do not say a great deal about their target
concepts. They are not, in other words, abundantly descriptive and so are
not a rich source of meaning. 6 It is useful to treat time as an entity, a
moving object for instance, so we might refer to and quantify it, but it is
incompletely useful. Meaningfulness is immeasurably advanced where
metaphoric concepts can be elaborated to provide whole systems of
meaning. Ontological and orientational metaphors become the constituents
of structural metaphors which are central to concepts and conceptual
models. Structural metaphors are infinitely more fertile than their
constituent metaphors because of the prospects for extensive elaboration to
considerable detail.10
7
104. See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 22.
105. To understand aspects of experience, such as emotions, events, and activities as entities and
substances, is to employ ontological metaphors. Lakoff and Johnson catalogue and elaborate upon
several important examples. For instance, expressions like "inflation is lowering our standard of living,"
and "we need to combat inflation" reveal the ontological metaphor inflation is an entity. LAKOFF &
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 26. Our conceptual system is, of course, rife with ontological metaphors,
without which it would be impossible to refer to, quantify, and reason about aspects of our experience
without natural dimensions. For further discussion of entity and substance metaphors, see id. at 25-32.
106. In combination, however, ontological and orientational metaphors enable considerable
reasoning about target concepts. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note I, at 25.
Orientational metaphors may organize entire systems of concepts in relation to one another. For
example, the up-down schema that emerges from recurring patterns of physical interaction orients a
number of abstract concepts in the nonphysical domain. The following expressions disclose the
underlying orientational metaphor, good is up/bad is down: "Things are looking up," "she's at the
pinnacle of her career," "he's low-down," "he sets high standards for himself," "we've bottomed-out,"
"things are going downhill," and "she graduated at the top of her class." Id. at 14-17.
In general, what is regarded to be good for people is conceptually oriented upward. The orientation
is not arbitrary, but is born oforientational correlates in physical experience. For instance, healthy, well
individuals are ordinarily upright, whereas unhealthy individuals are not: "He was down with a cold,
but now he's up and about"; "she's been under the weather for a long time." Professor Winter discusses
conventional up-down metaphors in the law (e.g., "they appealed to the highest court, the decision of
which will be binding on the lower court"). See Winter, supra note 4, at 1144-45. A discussion of the
coherence among the up-down spatialization metaphors in Western culture can be found in LAKOFF &
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 22-24 (explaining how, for instance, "more is better" coheres with "good is
up").
107. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note I, at 61. The experiential grounding of structural
metaphors is discussed in id. at 61-68. It should be noted that metaphoric concepts are not indefinitely
institutionalized, are not static:
If a new metaphor enters the conceptual system that we base our actions on, it will alter that
conceptual system and the perceptions and the actions that the system gives rise to. Much of
cultural change arises from the introduction of new metaphorical concepts and the loss of old
ones.
Id. at 145.
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The structural metaphor that partially defines the concept argument
illustrates the point. A variety of idioms reveal that we conceptualize the
activity of arguing in terms of the concept war.' 8 We "win" or "lose"
arguments, arguers "attack" one another's "positions," formulate "strate-
gies," "shoot holes" in opponents' arguments, "lose or gain ground," and
so on. It is not that we merely talk about argument this way, rather we
conceive arguers as "attacking" and "retreating" from argued positions, we
conceive postulates as "indefensible" or "unassailable."'0 9 The concept
argument in the target domain is structured in part by the concept war from
the source domain. There are ontological consequences as well, since the
concept bears on the way we go about arguing." 0 Where a cognitive
program is metaphoric, that is, where concepts are formulated and
structured by recourse to other concepts from different domains, under-
standing of experience is necessarily incomplete. Metaphoric structuring of
concepts is, so to say, partial by definition."' Multiple metaphors that
feature a range of aspects of a concept must therefore be employed in
The metaphor time is money, and its dissemination in the course of Westernizing the international
community, illustrates the point. The metaphor does not alter reality, "[b]ut changes in our [perceptions
of time, and an altered conceptualization of it] do change what is real for us and affect how we... act
upon those perceptions." Id. at 146. To recognize and acknowledge this characteristic of metaphoric
reasoning is to facilitate transformation in the law.
108. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 3-6; see also Winter, supra note 3, at 1410-11
(discussing how litigation is partially structured by the metaphoric concept rational argument is war).
109. "The metaphor is not merely in the words we use-it is in our very concept of argument. The
language of argument is not poetic, fanciful, or rhetorical; it is literal. We talk about arguments that way
because we conceive of them that way ...." LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 5.
110. Id. As Lakoff and Johnson observe: "We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the
person we are arguing with as an opponent .... Many of the things we do in arguing are partially
structured by the concept of war." Id. at 4.
111. Were the dimensions from the source and target domains identical in every particular, they
would be the same concept. If, for example, every dimension of the experience of arguing corresponded
completely with every dimension of the experience of war, the concepts would be identical. Of course,
they are not, but because they are perceived to share a number of salient dimensions, the concept of
argument is partially structured with reference to the concept of war.
To say that we understand one concept, argument, in terms of the other, war, is by no means to
indicate that we do not know the difference. At the same time, our metaphorical concepts may be so
pervasive and so deeply rooted as to be taken as literal descriptions. Consider, for instance, the
prevalent ontological metaphor, the mind is a brittle object, in evidence in expressions like "his ego is
extremely fragile," "she was crushed," "he cracked under pressure," and "she finally snapped."
"[O]ntological metaphors like these are so natural and so pervasive in our thought that they are usually
taken as self-evident, direct descriptions of mental phenomena. The fact that they are metaphorical never
occurs to most of us." Id. at 28.
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arriving at meaning." 2 The capacity to focus on and highlight multiple
aspects of experience enables an eminently richer concept of that experi-
ence. 113
In concluding this overview of Experientialism, a few observations are
in order. Experientialism rejects the a priori world of the Objectivist in
favor of a vision of experience structured and made meaningful by
internalized conceptual systems. Those systems are predicated on imagina-
tive principles of cognition. The process is animated by human purposes
subject to reevaluation and change. Necessarily, then, our concepts are
somewhat indeterminate.
At the same time, if categories and other experience-organizing
constructs are nowhere to be found except in our conceptual systems, they
are nevertheless securely grounded in and constrained by very real physical
and cultural experience external to the reasoner. Our conceptual system is
constrained in a very real way by that experience, such that while concepts
112. Professor Winter provides a helpful illustration:
Suppose that we are standing by the ocean on a windless day. We might describe the sea as
calm or flat. If it were a windy day, we might remark on the whitecaps or say that the sea
was hoary or that the waves were rushing toward the shore. Each of these descriptions
employs a metaphor, although some so common we no longer perceive them as such. Each
metaphor tells us something about the ocean. At the same time, each metaphor is partial and
incomplete; it hides or negates other truths about the ocean .... The waves may appear to
rush toward the shore, and may ... propel objects in that direction. But we also know...
that the water actually moves in place in a circular motion. The surface of the sea may appear
flat, but beneath the surface is a reality of valleys, ridges, trenches, and the like. While the
surface may appear calm, there also may be a deadly current underneath. We would use
another metaphor to describe that part of the sea's reality: We call it the undertow-as if
some underwater tug had fastened a towline about our ankles with which to drag us out to
sea.
Winter, supra note 3, at 1492.
113. The point about the partial nature of metaphoric structuring is an important one. By mapping
a well-structured source concept onto a target concept to establish analogies between them, metaphor
illuminates the dimly understood, and introduces coherence and order to concepts lacking natural
dimensions and systematicity. This is the power of metaphoric reasoning, but also its limitation. A
metaphoric concept usefully focuses on some aspects of a target concept, those aspects that suit the
purposes of scrutiny, but it necessarily highlights them to the mutual exclusion of others. LAKOPF &
JOHNSON, supra note I, at 10. Those aspects eclipsed are lost to consideration. A more completa
understanding of a concept requires that those aspects lost to view be brought back into focus.
Multiple metaphors that feature a range of aspects of a concept must therefore be employed in
arriving at meaning. The more important the concept, the more likely it is to be highly developed. For
example, Lakoff and Johnson offer ten distinct ontological metaphors by which the concept idea is
understood, including: ideas are food (e.g., "half-baked ideas," ideas as "food for thought"); ideas are
commodities (e.g., "that's a worthless idea," "[h]e won't buy that"); ideas are cutting instruments (e.g.,
"[hie has a razor wit," "[sihe cut his argument to ribbons"); and, ideas are people (e.g., "look at what
his ideas have spawned," "[t]he theory of relativity gave birth to an enormous number of ideas in
physics'). Id. at 46.48.
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are necessarily in some measure indeterminate and organic, they are in
important respects stable, and not wildly indeterminate. 14
Experientialism is not an invitation to embrace an "anything goes
relativism: in rejecting objectivism it does not deny a reality external to
cognitive processing.' The Experientialist alternative, then, is both
relativist and realist.!
6
III. METAPHORIC EXPLICATION OF ARTICLE 9 AND THE UNITARY AND
MULTIPLE VIEWS
A. The Ontological and Structural Metaphors That Structure Article 9
"The basic definition ... illustrates how the drafters speak of a security
interest as though it were a concrete thing.... It seems to have a location
just as though it were a table, a house, or any other physical object of
everyday life."" 7
Metaphorical structuring, it has been noted, is necessarily incomplete and
partial. In the law, as elsewhere, concepts from source domains focus on
distinct aspects of a concept in the target domain, and the two in confedera-
tion offer a more extensively descriptive model than any single metaphoric
concept acting alone could deliver."' This is no less the case for the law
governing secured transactions, Article 9. A complex of image schemata,
metaphoric mappings, models, and other imaginative instruments of
cognition operate in holistic combination to provide a fuller understanding
of the concept of secured lending.
From the provisions of Article 9 and the expository comments that attend
114. "What subjectivism specifically misses is that our understanding, even our most imaginative
understanding, is given in terms of a conceptual system that is grounded in our successful fiinctioning
in our physical and cultural environments." LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 94.
115. Rather, there remains a commitment to the existence of a real world external to human beings.
Id. at 226. Similarly, the relativist epistemology of Experientialism does not propose there are no
"truths," only that "there is no absolute standpoint from which to obtain absolute objective truths about
the world." Id. at 193.
116. The suggestion is "that many of the problem areas for our culture may come from a blind
acceptance of the myth of objectivism and that there is another alternative short of recourse to radical
subjectivity." Id. at 197.
117. Coogan, supra note 5, § 2.02[l][b].
118. See Winter, supra note 4, at 1106 (relating the study of law to that of politics, emotional
argument, and literary criticism). Cf. Winter, supra note 3, at 1382-86 (explaining the human cognition
model in which "human thought is grounded in physical experience and extended by means of idealized
cognitive models and metaphoric projections").
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them can be garnered the ontological and thematic metaphors that structure
the concept of the secured transaction. The cognitive model that character-
izes Article 9, in other words, consists of ontological elements and an
overarching structural metaphor according to which those elements are
organized.
Let us first identify some of the recurring ontological elements. Article
9 itself is understood as a container for those transactions within its scope.
Some transactions are within the article," 9 while others are excluded,
directly 20 or otherwise.' 2 ' This construct, then, is an instantiation of the
container image schema, where the structural elements that compose the
schema are mapped onto the nonphysical domain to yield the metaphor
Article 9 is a container for the transactions to which it applies. The
security interest is metaphorically cast as an entity. By virtue of the simple
ontological metaphor'2 the security interest is an object, it is figured a
palpable thing to which we might refer as "arising,"' 2' being "creat-
ed,'. 24 "attaching,"'" as being "perfected' 126 or "assigned." Treating the
security interest as an entity, however, is minimally descriptive and can
take us only so far in developing the concept. Thus, additional ontological
metaphors are employed as well. For instance, the security interest is not
simply an entity, but in particular it is a substance'2 7 which "attaches
119. Article 9 "applies to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a
security interest in personal property or fixtures." U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (1990).
120. See U.C.C. § 9-104 (1990) (listing excluded transactions which otherwise might fall within
the broad terms of inclusion of U.C.C. § 9-102).
121. Some transactions clearly within § 9-102(1), and not expressly excluded by § 9-104, might
still be implicitly excluded in application. See F. Stephen Knippenberg, Tacit Exclusion: Defining Code
Terms Using Extraneous Referents, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1261 (1988) (discussing the implicit
exclusion of a transfer of an interest in liquor licenses for security).
122. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text for a brief discussion ofontological metaphors.
123. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-113 (1990) (regarding security interests arising under Article 2).
124. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) (1990) (regarding creation of security interest by the parties).
125. The drafters viewed the security interest "as a limited interest which adheres in or attaches
to personal property." Coogan, supra note 5, § 2.02[l][a], at 2-8 (emphasis added).
126. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-303 (1990) (regarding perfection of security interests).
127. To regard the security interest as a substance is still to deploy an ontological metaphor, but
of a particular type. Entity, substance, and container metaphors are all varieties of ontological metaphor.
The point is that there is more at work here than simply reifying or thingifying the security interest.
The container schema is specially relevant to the Article 9 problem addressed later in this paper.
Events are understood metaphorically as bounded objects and, therefore, as containers. Races, for
example, with their beginning and ending points, are bounded in space and time and are viewed as
containers. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 31. Important aspects of priority among creditors arc
understood metaphorically in terms of a race.
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to"' 28 and "continues in" the collateral 29 when the necessary conditions
are met.
On attachment, the security interest becomes "enforceable" against the
debtor and others. 3 ' The force image schema motivates 3 this metaphor.
The schema derives from recurring patterns in physical experience where
force is encountered as the interaction of objects under compulsion. 132 The
schematic elements, including a path of motion along a vector, a source or
origin of force, and objects acted upon,133 are mapped onto the security
interest to produce the metaphor the security interest is a force exerted
against the debtor and creditors. Each of the two emergent concepts from
the physical domain, substance and force, focuses on a different dimension
of the security interest according to the purpose to be served by the concept.
t34
The metaphoric concept of the security interest as a substance that exerts
128. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-203 (1990) (regarding attachment and enforcement of security interests).
129. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1990) (providing that "a security interest continues in collateral
notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition").
130. U.C.C. § 9-203 (1990) (regarding attachment and enforceability of security interests).
131. Motivation is used here in the technical sense given it in cognitive theory. To say that the force
image schema motivates a metaphor is to say that the metaphor makes sense in the context of the
schema. The metaphor is not predicted by the motivating principle, that is, the extension is not required
by the force schema, but the metaphoric extension is understandable in light of it and, thus, is not
arbitrary. See LAKOFF, supra note I, at 96.
132. Our daily interactions regularly involve the exertion of force,
either as we act upon other objects, or as we are acted upon by them. Therefore, in our efforts
at comprehending our experience, structures of force come to play a central role. Since our
experience is held together by forceful activity, our web of meanings is connected by the
structures of such activity.
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 42. For an extended discussion of the preconceptual gestalts for force, see
id. at 42-64. Metaphorical projections of the force schema are considered in id. at 62-63.
133. See id. at 42-43.
134. Metaphoric choices are always made in service of understanding relative to our purposes and
so are constrained by purpose. Our purposes are themselves constrained by experience out of which they
arise. The experience in which purposes, and thereby the conceptual choices that give vent to them, are
grounded is the product of our physical interactions with the environment as well as our cultural
interactions. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 117. What emerges from experience is a sense
of what is experientially significant.
For example, as noted earlier, the concept of time is partially understood in terms of the metaphor
time is a resource. The choice of the metaphor is motivated by the fact that, in Western culture, we
experience time in that way, so that the metaphor naturally emerges from experience to highlight that
aspect of the concept of time that is culturally preeminent. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at
66-67. For other purposes, it suits our ends to view time according to the metaphor time is a moving
object, with the future oriented in front of us. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
The point to be taken is that the choices are not objectively mandated, but are a function of
experiential grounding and utility. Time is by no means experienced in all cultures as a resource, nor
in every culture do people "face the future." See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 42.
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force-that is enforceable against someone-is coherent'35  with the
received concept of the contract obligation. 136 Agreements, contracts, and
obligations are understood metaphorically to be containers: we "enter into"
agreements and are "bound by" our obligations, or we may try to "get out"
or "back out" of our contracts. (I am here adopting the practice of referring
to all three as the metaphor obligations are containers.)137
135. When metaphors present a single image, they are said to be consistent, whereas multiple
metaphors employed to provide layers of meaning by focusing on different aspects of a concept
frequently are not. There is nothing surprising in this since concepts from a source domain do not stand
in a one-to-one relationship to one another.
Consider, for example, the metaphor time is a moving object, which finds expression in a number
of internally consistent statements, subcategories of the principal metaphor. Thus, "time flies," "I am
looking forward to this coming weekend," and "don't let this opportunity pass you by" are consistent,
in that they present the same image of time as an object facing us and proceeding in our direction from
the future, which is itself in front of us. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 42. But we also
conceptualize time as a stationary thing toward which we move, thus the expressions, "as we enter the
'90s," "as we near the end of the week," and "we made it through this year without a hitch." Id. at 43-
44.
The metaphor time is stationary and ive pass through it is not consistent with the metaphor time Is
a moving object, as they present different images. The metaphors are, however, coherent. That is, both
entail that time passes from a point in front of us to points behind us. The two metaphors cohere in that
both contain subcategories of the central metaphor time goes past us from front to back, and thereby
share a common entailment. Id. at 44.
Professor Winter has shown how the metaphoric concepts by which litigation is understood, while
not consistent, are coherent. He identifies the following metaphors that structure the concept: litigation
is an ordeal; litigation is combat; litigation is a play; litigation is a religious ritual; and litigation Is a
game.
Apparently inconsistent metaphors, such as these . . . are coherent, and therefore work
together, when they each have similar entailments. Each ... shares entailments with the
orientational "standing" metaphor: We stand at religious ceremonies; most of our fighting is
upright (as in "stand up and fight like a man"); the notion of ordeal is often expressed
through this metaphor (as in "if you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen"); and the
only people who always remain seated at a play are the audience.
Winter, supra note 3, at 1498-99.
136. As defined by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981), a contract is "a
promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which
the law in some way recognizes as a duty." The Uniform Commercial Code focuses on a different
aspect of contract, which it defines as "the total legal obligation which results from the parties'
agreement." U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (1990). An agreement is "the bargain of the parties in fact." § 1-201(3).
An in-depth exposition of the metaphors that underlie contract is beyond the scope of this Article, but
would doubtless prove a fascinating and productive enterprise, particularly in light of what some
commentators have described as a shift from classical contract theory. See Richard F. Speidel, The New
Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. & CoM. 193, 198-99 (1982); see also Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship
and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1223 (1984) (proposing and developing
a consent theory of contract).
137. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-204 cmt. (1990) ("If the parties intend to enter into a binding agreement,
this subsection recognizes that agreement as valid in law... .") (emphasis added). Obligations are also
understood metaphorically as physical burdens. See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 35.
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Thus, the two metaphors, one of the security interest as an entity that
exerts force, the other of the obligation or agreement as a container into
which the debtor enters, while presenting two different images, nevertheless
present coherent metaphors. Working in concert, they enable a more
complete sense of the concepts of the security agreement and security
interest as they relate to the debtor. 38
In general, then, the ontological metaphors that partially structure the
conceptual model of the secured transaction consist in several substance
and container metaphors. Having noted a few of them, we turn to the
central metaphor that structures'39 the concept of the secured transaction as
I believe it is proposed in the statute, namely, to yield the metaphor the
secured transaction is a journey.
Consider the dimensions of the concept journey in the physical domain.
A journey consists of a beginning point, a path, a direction, and an ending
point. '4 The structure of Article 9 is similarly organized. In the life of a
secured transaction, there is a point of origin (the creation of the security
interest), and apath defined by interim, contiguous points (validity) through
which "steps" are taken to a destination (perfection). 4 '
Each of the component concepts for creation, such as the requirement
138. A variant of the container metaphor has to do with the secured party. The obligation, a
container within which the debtor is bound, is itself conceived as contained, that is, as secured.
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1214 (3d ed. 1988) defines "secure" as "free from danger, not
exposed to damage" and "in safekeeping or custody." This particular case of containment, then, has a
beneficent aspect in that it connotes a protective confinement in favor of the secured creditor.
139. See generally supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing structural metaphors).
140. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 89-91. The journey model is commonly employed
to structure metaphorically a variety of abstract concepts. For instance, the journey model partially
structures the concept argument, as reflected in a number of expressions used in talking about
arguments: we set out to prove our point, we arrive at a conclusion, or we may go in the wrong
direction, argue in circles, go back over a point or find that fellow arguers are not following us. Id.
The concept love is also understood partly according to the journey model, generating expressions
like, "[o]ur marriage is on the rocks," "[tihis relationship is a dead-end street," and "[w]e've gotten off
the track." Id. at 44-45. For additional examples, see LAKOFF, supra note 1, at 439 ("it's time to get
on with your life" reflecting the metaphor life is a journey); id. at 435 ("do it over" disclosing the
metaphor an activity is a journey).
141. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text, outlining in conventional terms the steps to
creating and perfecting a security interest.
States, such as perfection, are understood through the ontological metaphor states are substances,
and substances can themselves be understood metaphorically as containers. For instance, to remark,
"we're out of trouble now" employs the metaphors trouble is a substance and trouble is a container.
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 30-32. States, like perfection, may also be a particular kind of
container, namely, they can be understood as locations (e.g., "he's in a world of trouble'), and can
therefore be taken to be destinations, as spatial end-points in a journey. Cf LAKOFF, supra note 1, at
275.
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that a debtor have rights in the collateral, has an interesting metaphorical
heritage that provides the background against which the journey metaphor
is set. One of these, the requirement from section 9-203(1)(c) that the
secured party give value, is of special relevance to the discussion that
follows, and will receive attention here. The term "value," as it is defined
in the U.C.C., imports a fundamental concept from contract, the concept of
exchange.'42
The law of contract has relentlessly insisted, with some few exceptions,
that a promise will be enforced only if the promisee gave something which
induced its making, and, in times past, that the promisee either conferred
some benefit upon the maker or himself suffered some detriment. 43 The
ordinance that there be an exchange is captured in the consideration
doctrine,1" presumably to avoid the consequences that would follow were
the law to compel performance of every promise uttered irrespective of the
level of reflection that attended its making.
45
The source-path-goal image schema partially characterizes the cognitive
142. This, of course, is standard fare. "[Tlhe ... law of contracts is confined to promises the law
will enforce. It is therefore concerned primarily with exchanges because... courts have generally been
unwilling to enforce a promise unless the promisee has given the promisor something in return for it."
E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 4 (1992). This requirement has been tied to our economic
structure, the free enterprise system: "Such a system allocates resources largely by direct bilateral
exchanges arranged by bargaining between individuals. In these exchanges each gives something to the
other and receives in return something from the other." Id. at 6.
143. The requirement of a benefit comes from the action in debt which would not lie without a quid
pro quo, FARNSWORTH, supra note 142, at 14, 20, and the requirement of a detriment from the action
of assumpsit. Id. at 16, 20. The requirement of consideration in this sense, that is, so far as it was
understood to require benefit and detriment, began to disappear around the end of the nineteenth century
to be replaced by the bargained-for exchange, or bargain theory of contract. Id. at 43. Benefit and
detriment, for example, is nowhere mentioned as part of the definition of consideration in the first
Restatement. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 75 (1928).
In the Restatement (Second), "a promise which is bargained for is consideration if, but only if, the
promised performance would be consideration." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75 (1981).
As a result, "[v]irtually anything that anyone would bargain for in exchange for a promise can be
consideration for that promise. What matters under the bargain theory is 'the relation of reciprocal
conventional inducement, each for the other."' OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 293-94 (1881).
Nevertheless, there is that about the value requirement ofU.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c) (1990), both as the term
is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(44), and as it seems to have been implicitly taken in the arguments over
future advance and nonadvance priorities, see infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text, that suggests
the need for a benefit conferred is not completely dead.
144. "Among the limitations on the enforcement of promises, the most fundamental is the
requirement of consideration," without which few promises will be enforced. FARNSwORTH, supra note
142, at 41.
145. "No legal system has ever been reckless enough to make all promises enforceable." Id. at 12.
See also Morris F. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 572-73 (1932).
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model of the exchange in which we see one party to the exchange as the
source of consideration, the recipient party as the goal or destination, and
a path traced between them along which the consideration (which, as in the
case of the exchange of promises, is understood metaphorically) trav-
els. t46 The concept of the exchange, however, requires more than this. The
source-path-goal schema, with the special reciprocal adaptation, successful-
ly evokes an image of objects tracing a path between parties, and while this
is certainly a dimension of the exchange, alone it does not capture and
distinguish the concept. It is the introduction of the balance schema 47 that
distinguishes the exchange to make it something more than an instance of
objects passing back and forth between parties.
The sense of equilibriumt4 that emerges from the balance schema
146. The source-path-goal schema received brief attention earlier as an example of one of the
important image schemata so far identified in cognitive theory. Its structural elements, it will be
recalled, consist of a source or beginning point, a goal or destination point, and a connecting path
defined by a direction toward the goal. See supra note 95.
The schema is readily traceable to its origins in the world of spatial experience. From the time we
are able to crawl across the nursery floor to reach some object of interest on other side, we find
ourselves endlessly moving from one physical point to another. We travel from home to the office, from
the family room to the kitchen, from one city, state, or country to the next. From these repeating
patterns emerges the source-path-goal schema. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 113. The schema is
metaphorically mapped to define, for example, the concept of achieving our goals and purposes. In the
resulting metaphoric concept, goals and purposes are metaphorically understood as destinations.
The metaphor purposes are physical goals is grounded in the path schema and in the metaphor
states are locations. Progress toward a physical goal from a starting point along a path, the structural
elements of the path schema, are mapped onto the experience of making progress toward the
accomplishment of abstract goals (e.g., earning a law degree). Where the abstract goal is some state,
like "euphoria," the state is understood as a final destination in the form of a physical locus. See id. at
113-15.
The correlation of physical destinations is not arbitrary, but is experientially based and systematic.
Our goals are frequently to find ourselves in a new physical location, either for its own sake or with
the intention of accomplishing some purpose in the new location. For an extended analysis, and an
account of the basis for the mapping of structural details, see id. at 116-17.
147. The balance schema is ubiquitous and central to the way we think about the world across a
broad range of experiences. Its physical basis is self-obvious: "First and foremost, balancing is
something we do. The baby stands, wobbles, and drops to the floor. It tries again, and again, and again,
until a new world opens up-the world of balanced erect posture." Id. at 74.
But the balance schema is more than a matter of learning to stand, walk, ride a bicycle, or similar
physical experiences that immediately come to mind. Systemic balance emerges very early from bodily
equilibrium or lack of it: "There is too much acid in the stomach, the hands are too cold, the head is
too hot .... the mouth is too dry. In these and numerous other ways we learn the meaning of lack of
balance .... " Id. at 75. The closely allied preconceptual experience of internal bodily equilibrium
likewise contributes meaning to the concept of balance. For a comprehensive discussion of the balance
schema, its bodily basis, various senses, and metaphorical mappings, see id. at 74-96.
148. Johnson discusses metaphorical elaborations of the balance schema, id. at 80, and the
interrelationship of its various senses, id. at 85. As to the equilibrium schema in particular, it results
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animates the reciprocal transfers to yield the unique concept of the
exchange.'49 The concept is thus a gestalt, in that the dynamic conjunction
of the source-path-goal and balance schemata enables a concept greater
than the sum of those component parts. What makes the exchange a
concept distinct from a bland (empty of the unique implications of the
exchange within contract) mutual transfer is the sense of disequilibrium or
asymmetry, which arises where one party transfers something to another,
and continues until the transferring party receives something in return.'
The exchange metaphor finds its way into Article 9 through the
definition of the term "value" in section 1-201(44), which does not offer
a definition in the usual sense but proclaims the cases in which value is
deemed given."' In the context of the "value" application of the exchange
in Article 9, the statutory characterization of the term defines the dimen-
from a "continuous mapping of symmetrical force vectors." Id. at 86. Metaphorical mappings to
systemic balance, psychological balance, the balance of rational argument, legalmoral balance, and
mathematical balance are described and explained as well. Id. at 87-96.
149. This explication, of course, does not comport with twentieth century bargain theory of contract
which is indifferent to benefits bestowed and detriments suffered, see supra note 143, and is, in theory
at least, indifferent to the sufficiency of consideration, an indifference reflective of the bargain theory
as it is "epitomized in the Restatement." FARNSWORTH, supra note 142, at 69. Farnsworth also notes
that, the bargain theory notwithstanding, "courts have not lost the habit of speaking of an 'adequate'
consideration, a 'sufficient' or 'valuable' consideration." Id. at 68-69.
150. In Restatement terms, there must be a "bargain," an "exchange." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 17 (1981). What is exchanged are either mutual promises or a promise and performance.
The exchange is, of course, metaphorically understood, conspicuously so in the case of bilateral
contracts where a promise is given for "a return promise." See id. § 71(1). On the bargain view of the
exchange, the requirement of an exchange is not an invitation to inquire as to whether the promisee's
return promise produces an economic benefit to the promisor or corresponding economic detriment to
the promisee. The only question permitted to be raised under the bargain theory is whether the return
promise was bargained for, whether it was, in the language of § 71(2), "sought by the promisor in
exchange for his promise."
A different aspect of equilibrium than that embodied in the exchange is captured by the metaphor
expressed in the doctrine of mutuality of obligation. The focus is not upon something of worth passing
back and forth between parties, but upon a mutuality of restriction resulting from obligations
undertaken. Stated simply, under the doctrine of mutuality of obligation, if one party to a contract is
not bound by its promise, perhaps because the promise proves to be illusory, then neither is the other
party bound by its promise. IA ARTHuR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 152, at 4 (1963). As
Corbin puts it, mutuality of obligation expresses "the idea that each party is under a legal duty to the
other." Id. (emphasis added).
151. U.C.C. § 1-201(44) (1990). As noted earlier, § 9-203(I)(b) requires that value be given as a
condition of attachment of the security interest, without which the security interest is enforceable against
no one. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The provision does not state that value must be
given by the secured party. See Flechtner, supra note 18, at 723-24; Justice, supra note 46, at 877. This
creates complications where a secured party takes an otherwise unsecured claim by assignment. See
infra Part IV.
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sional "fit" with the exchange model-mutual transfers and an equilibrium
of forces between the parties-sufficient to establish an enforceable security
interest. The metaphoric model of the exchange legislates to this extent the
creation of the relationships unique to the secured transaction. The
exchange is thus an element of one of the steps to validity and, ultimately,
to perfection, which are components of the central metaphor, the creation
and perfection of a security interest is a journey.
Of the parties who may compete for a debtor's property, one will be said
to have priority over'52 the claims of others to the collateral. Article 9 rules
of priority thus add an additional metaphoric layer to the central journey
metaphor. In the journey toward a perfected security interest, the object is
priority in the distribution of assets.'53 The object, that is to say, is not only
to finish, but to finish first. The movement from creation, through validity
and perfection, to a position of priority is not merely a journey-it is a
race.54 The race is, in fact, a special case of journey, with which it
shares the ontological elements (in specialized application) a beginning
point (starting line), path (track), and destination (finish line). It is a special
case by virtue of certain additional elements: a race is a journey wherein
there are winners and losers, with accolades awarded to the party first to
complete the journey, the winner of the race. 55
152. This is standard parlance, institutionalized in Article 9 and ubiquitous in the professional
literature. See, e.g., 2 GILMORE, supra note 19. Section 9-301, for instance, "lists the classes of persons
who take priority over an unperfected security interest." U.C.C. § 9-301 cmt. 1 (1990). Section 9-312,
establishing priorities among competing security interests in the same collateral, characterizes the
concept of priority according to the same metaphor. U.C.C. § 9-312 (1990). See infra note 158 for
examples from the text of the provision and the official comments.
153. The elaboration of the journey metaphor to that of the race is unnecessary where the characters
involved in the secured transaction consist only of the secured party and the debtor. Once the journey
through the steps to creating a valid security interest is completed, the secured creditor may exercise
its right to dispose of the collateral in satisfaction of the secured obligation on the debtor's default. See
U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-501 (1990). Perfecting the security interest adds nothing to the secured party's
arsenal of rights vis-i-vis the debtor, nor does the failure to perfect diminish those rights. The point is
simply to complete the journey to an enforceable security interest as in § 9-203.
154. The metaphor is at times explicit. In § 9-312(5) the drafter refers to the "race of diligence."
U.C.C. § 9-312 cmt. 5, ex. 2. (1990). Even where it is not explicit, the metaphor boils very near the
surface in expressions that describe priorities in terms of the race in particular or competitions in
general. For instance, priority is a something a creditor "wins," § 9-312 cmt. 4, and is something for
which a party must "qualify," id. at cmt. 7, ex. 5. Compare § 9-313 cmt. 4(a) (security interest in
fixtures which is filed first "can defeat a subsequent real estate interest") with § 9-313 cmt. 4(b)
(security interest in fixtures may have priority "as against" other real estate claimants).
155. Such it is that § 9-312, for instance, is frequently described in the literature as a "pure race
statute," on the basis of which, e.g., "the one who wins the 'race' to the courthouse to file is superior."
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 1037. The notion is embalmed in the aphorism, "First in time,
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The journey metaphor is sufficient to define the life of the security
interest only so long as the parties involved are limited to the debtor and
secured party. On the introduction of other claimants to the collateral, the
prospect of competition among them emerges. In the end, one must have
priority over the others, and, in light of the journey metaphor, the
elaboration to the race metaphor is natural."5 6 Where, for example, two
secured creditors have competing security interests in the same collateral,
the first to have completed the journey, to have taken the necessary steps
to arrive at perfection, is prior to the other, both in the sense of finishing
ahead of the other and in the sense of earning superior status for its claim
to the collateral."5 7 The winner of the race is thus said to have priority
over' the other secured party, who, accordingly, is said to have rights
subordinate to" 9 the earlier perfected security interest.
B. The Metaphoric Concepts Underlying the Unitary and Multiple
Views
The Coogan-Gilmore debate over the nature of the security interest is a
debate over the selection of the ontological metaphor to characterize it.
first in right."
156. That is to say, the race metaphor emerges naturally from commercial lending experience. The
choice of the race metaphor is not arbitrary. Awarding priority based on time of perfection or filing
naturally evokes the gestalt of the race with which it is perceived to share key ontological elements.
There are systematic correlations within the two experiences that motivate the metaphor.
Lakoff and Johnson illustrate the point in their discussion of the experiential basis of the structural
metaphor discussed earlier, argument is war. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text. They
identify a conversation as having some six experiential dimensions: participants, parts (turns at talking,
etc.), stages (beginning, central part, and end), linear sequence, causation ("The finish of one turn at
talking is expected to result in the beginning of the next turn."), and purpose. LAKOIF & JOHNSON,
supra note 1, at 78. These same dimensions that characterize conversation likewise constitute argument,
but a sense of embattlement introduced into the experience transforms the former into the latter. See
id. at 78-79.
157. This rule is set forth in U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1990) governing priority among secured creditors
with security interests in the same collateral.
158. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-312(2), (3), (5) (1990); id. cmts. 3, 4, 8; § 9-313(4); see also § 9-308
("A purchaser of chattel paper or an instrument... has priority over a security interest in the chattel
paper or instrument.'); §9-301 (entitled in part "Persons Who Take Priority Over Unperfected Security
Interests").
Priority is also partly understood through the simple ontological metaphorpriority is an object, that
can be given, see, e.g., § 9-312 cmt. 2, taken, see, e.g., § 9-309, or retained, id. cmt. 3.
159. U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1990) does not use this term, but it is usual to describe the status of a
claimant without priority in other contexts. See, e.g., § 9-301(l)("[a]n unperfected security interest is
subordinate to the rights of.... ."), and § 9-313(6) ("[a] security interest in fixtures is subordinate to
a construction mortgage . .. ."). One might certainly say something like, "security interest A is
subordinate to security interest B under § 9-312(5)" without fear of raising an eyebrow.
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Both views "thingify" the security interest, that is both treat it metaphori-
cally as an entity, but under Gilmore's conceptualization the security
interest is an expanding substance that attaches when value is first
advanced and continues until extinguished by one means or another. 6 ' The
ontological metaphor, the security interest is an expanding substance, is
coherent' 6 ' with the structural metaphor, 62 the security interest is a
journey. The image of an undifferentiated substance, attaching on the first
advance and continuing thereafter but fluctuating in its contours, establishes
the beginning and ending points of the journey through Article 9. Coogan's
metaphor, the security interest is an entity created with each advance,
similarly coheres with the journey metaphor, but establishes a series of
beginning points (a series of attachments), one for each security interest
validated by individual advances.
Both metaphors, then, seek to operate within the journey metaphor. The
inconsistent concepts present no normative conflict thus far because their
entailments are of no practical consequence where there are no parties to
be reckoned aside from the secured party and debtor. Gilmore's metaphor
entails that the ending point of the journey is the initial advance,'63 whereas
Coogan's metaphor allows for multiple ending points. Where the journey
ends (whether with the initial or future advance) is immaterial as to the
debtor, who is no more or less liable for future advance obligations under
the one view than under the other.
The entailments that flow from each of the two characterizations do have
practical consequences where a third-party claimant is implicated. Recalling
our earlier illustration of the future advance transaction, the hypothetical
unsecured creditor acquired its lien between advances, and the value of the
collateral was inadequate to satisfy both the lien and the obligations from
all the advances made by the secured creditor. If Gilmore's individuated but
formless substance presents a rather indistinct image, it is sufficiently
definite to convey the certain picture of an intervening creditor's lien
compressed to a nullity as the security interest bloats with the debtor's
shriveling equity in the endeavor to satisfy a debt burgeoning from multiple
advances.
160. Gilmore describes "one security interest" that "fluctuates in amount." 2 GILMORE, supra note
19, at 936.
161. See supra note 135 for an explanation of metaphorical coherence and consistency.
162. Structural metaphors are discussed supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
163. This assumes, of course, all other requisites for creating and perfecting a security interest have
been met. On the requirements, see supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
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Coogan and others seized upon the expanding substance metaphor in
arguing for the multiple view."6 Through elaboration and extension of the
metaphor to disclose the consequences of its entailments, the arguments are
armed. For instance, both the intervening lienholder and debtor are said to
be in need of protection against the security interest: 6 ' the debtor who
would be prevented from "selling [his] equity,"' 66 and the lienholder
because she would be otherwise "sitting helpless"'167 before it with no
hope of satisfying her lien, and so would be "squeezed out"'t6 by the
security interest. Gilmore's expanding substance is no longer benign, or
even neutral. Now, it is a threat against which the lienholder and debtor
should be "protected." It is also a very powerful threat before which the
lienholder is "helpless."
At Coogan's hands, Gilmore's amorphous substance 69 is exposed as a
roiling, ominous, and all-consuming mass reminiscent of something from
the low-grade horror films of the 1950s and 1960s. By elaborating and
extending Gilmore's undifferentiated substance metaphor, Coogan produces
a highly charged image to challenge the unitary view. Against the backdrop
164. Indeed, Gilmore credits Coogan with suggesting the unitary concept in the first place. See 2
GILMORE, supra note 19, at 936 n.4 (citing Coogan, Floating Lien, supra note 19, at 867). Coogan, in
turn, seems to accept credit from Gilmore in Coogan, Federal Tax Lien Act, supra note 41, at 1402.
165. See Peter F. Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARV. L. REv. 477, 514 (1973).
166. Coogan, Intangibles, supra note 36, at 1029.
167. Coogan, Floating Lien, supra note 19, at 868.
168. In an intriguing and ingenious case study of substance metaphors, Lakoff demonstrates how
the human emotion anger is conceptualized as a substance, a hot liquid, within a container, the human
body.
We also know that intense heat produces steam and creates pressure on the container. This
yields the metaphorical entailments:
Intense anger produces steam.
-She got all steamed up.
-Billy's just blowing off steam.
-I was fuming.
Intense anger produces pressure on the container.
-He was bursting with anger.
-I could barely contain my rage.
-I could barely keep it in anymore.
LAKOFF, supra note 1, at 385.
169. Actually, the characterization, a single amorphous security interest, is Coogan's, or at least
Coogan's and Gordon's. See Coogan & Gordon, Receivables, supra note 38, at 1549; see also Coogan,
Federal Tax Lien Act, supra note 41, at 1403 (describing the unitary security interest as "a single,
balloon type of UCC-protected security interest which expands as more debt is covered by it and
contracts as some debt is paid off').
For other coherent characterizations in the literature, see, for example, Comment, supra note 37, at
135 (analogizing the security interest to "one big cloud that mushrooms as further advances are made"),
and Justice, supra note 46, at 896 (describing "floating debt").
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of the elaborated contained substance metaphor, the lienholder and debtor
become captives and victims of the security interest securing future
advances.
Coogan's argument for denying priority to the future advance lender also
operates coherently within the race metaphor. When value is first advanced
to the debtor (assuming all other steps are taken), there exists from that
point an enforceable, perfected security interest. The security interest,
personified as a competitor, has completed the race to priority, has crossed
the finish line. If a creditor subsequently acquires a lien, it is perfectly
consistent with our knowledge of races to award priority to the secured
party who, after all, was first to finish.
On the other hand, when a future advance is made sometime after the
lien is acquired, the secured party appears to have finished the race at that
time. However, to award priority to the secured creditor as to the future
advance contradicts our knowledge of what happens in races, that is, the
epistemic knowledge of the race that accompanies the race metaphor into
the target domain of the secured transaction. The secured creditor seems to
be completing the race later but finishing first nevertheless. 7 ' In giving
priority to the lien creditor, the multiple view avoids a result that runs
counter to our knowledge of races.
In contrast to the satisfying result of the multiple view, the unitary view
appears to reach a conclusion at odds with the metaphors that structure the
controlling concepts in Article 9. What saves the unitary view from an
apparently dysfunctional result is that Gilmore's enriched-estatejustification
brings the analysis safely within the constraints of the guiding metaphor of
the race to render the decision in favor of the secured creditor consistent
with epistemic knowledge of competitions. This is accomplished in part
through the coherence of the race and exchange metaphors, and in part
through the conceptual alignment of the lien creditor with the debtor. We
consider each principle in turn.
We have seen how the race metaphor coheres with the contained-
170. Coogan and Gordon ask, "[o]f course, S [secured party] would be ahead of J [judgment lien
holder] for the [pre-lien advance]; however, would S also be ahead as to [post-lien advances] on the
ground that it is secured by one amorphous security interest?" Coogan & Gordon, Receivables, supra
note 38, at 1549 (emphasis added). In the context of a different but related priority dispute between
secured creditors where both have perfected by filing financing statements, Coogan employs a supple-
mentary metaphor that coheres with that of the race: "[S]ince A's filing had been made [earlier than
that of a competing secured party, Y] his [A's] security interest... vaulted over the security interest
of Y, which had been fully perfected ten days earlier." Coogan, Floating Lien, supra note 19, at 859
(emphasis added).
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substance metaphor. The common entailment is the concept of containment.
To conceptualize the collateral and the priority race to be containers is to
establish ontological correspondences, correspondences between entities in
the source domain (containers from the physical domain) and target domain
(the collateral is a container for the security interest, the race a container
for the competitors).'' It is also to establish certain epistemic correspon-
dences as well, correspondences, that is, between knowledge about the
source domain and knowledge about the target concept.
One example of epistemic correspondence has already been noted,
namely, the knowledge of what happens to expanding substances in
containers in the physical domain and what happens to lienholders and a
debtor's equity when a security interest expands with multiple advance
obligations. 72 But the race metaphor shares epistemic correspondences with
the exchange metaphor as well, so that the two metaphors, although not
consistent, are coherent.
First, consider what we know about races. The race is a special kind of
journey because it is partially structured by the concept of competition, and
has the following ontological elements: a starting line, a finish line,
competitors, winners, losers, and a reward or prize for the victor.'73 An
epistemic element of competitions, hence the race, is the conviction that
those who compete unfairly are not entitled to win, and those with an
advantage over other contestants do not have to compete unfairly. Seriously
171. Consider again the metaphor anger is a heated substance within a container, the human body.
See supra note 168. The ontological correspondences, the correspondences between entities in the
defining concept and the defined concept, include: the container (source domain) is the body (target
domain); the hot fluid (source) is anger (target); heat in a container (source) is heat in the body (target);
agitation of contained fluid (source) is physical agitation (target). LAKOFF, supra note 1, at 387. The
epistemic correspondences, correspondences of what we know about the source domain with the concept
to be defined by the metaphor, include: the effect of fluid heat is heat within the container, internal
pressure and agitation within the container (source), and the corresponding effect of anger is body heat,
internal pressure within the body, and physiological agitation (target); when a contained fluid is
overheated, the container explodes (source), whereas when anger exceeds the limits of the individual
to container, she loses control. Id.
172. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
173. Much epistemic knowledge is premised upon folk theory arrived at by cultural consensus. For
example, in the anger-is-a-hot-fluid metaphor, supra notes 168 and 171, epistemic knowledge of the
way in which contained hot liquids behave correlates to folk theory of the physiological effects of
anger. On the common folk theory about these effects, anger yields increased body heat, internal bodily
pressure, agitation and distortion of perception, and as anger increases, these physiological effects
correspondingly increase. LAKOFF, supra note 1, at 381. The folk theory is instantiated in a variety of
expressions, like, "he blew his stack" (internal bodily pressure), "cool down" (internal body heat), and
"she was blind with rage" (distortion of perception). See id. at 383-85.
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disadvantaged contestants do not meaningfully compete at all.
That conviction, I believe, is carried to the arena of the priority dispute
and corresponds to the balance component of the concept of the exchange
to accomplish coherence across metaphors. The concept of fairness is
structured in part by the balance image schema. 74 Circumstances are fair
when forces are evenly matched, when they are of equal weight.t75 The
balance schema, I have claimed, is important in imparting the distinctive
quality to the mutual transfer of objects or promises to produce the gestalt
concept of the exchange.'76 The balance element is the point of commonali-
ty, the shared entailment of the concept of fairness as it relates to
competitions-here, the race-and as it relates to the doctrinal requirement
of consideration in the concept of the exchange and the need for balance.
For Coogan, the security interest that absorbs the debtor's equity to
squeeze out the lien creditor, having finished the race to priority later (at
the time of the postlien future advance) does not compete fairly. But the
corresponding sense of balance entailed by the exchange metaphor offers
Gilmore a basis on which to answer that charge within the framework of
the same controlling metaphors. The late finish, if there is one, is justified
because the future advance enriches the debtor's estate to restore balance
at the level of the exchange. Something of value is made available to
creditors disadvantaged by the special starting point of the future advance
lender.'77 This reinstates the balance, albeit indirectly by derivation from the
entailments of the exchange model, that renders the exchange "fair" and
seems to fulfill any analogous requirement for fair competition required by
the entailments of the race metaphor. It is the coherence of these entail-
ments, shared by the game and exchange metaphors, that quiets the
unsettling sense that accompanies an award of priority that otherwise smells
of unjust enrichment.
At the level of metaphor, the distributive priority that follows from the
174. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the balance image schema.
175. For an in-depth discussion of the various metaphorical senses and extensions of the balance
schema, see JOHNSON, supra note I, at 85-96. For an interesting discussion of the concepts of legal and
moral balance in particular, and for a critique of the balance structure as it is employed in the special
brand of consequentialist reasoning "widely accepted by lawyers, judges, social workers" and others,
see id. at 90-95.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 148-50.
177. Notwithstanding that it has long been out of fashion to evaluate what is exchanged between
bargainers in finding contract, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981), I believe
Gilmore's enriched estate justification, taken together with the definition of the term "value" in U.C.C.
§ 101(44) (1990), invite an inquiry into the relative values of what has been exchanged in the
contract-the security agreement-between the debtor and secured party.
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unitary view seems conceptually dysfunctional, because it violates shared
expectations of what happens in races. The race metaphor entails that those
who finish first prevail, and to award priority to the postlien nonadvance
obligation does not comport with that understanding. In the case of future
advances, the integrity of that epistemic knowledge seems to be preserved
derivatively in the restoration of equilibrium at the point the entailments of
the exchange and race metaphors converge. Where a creditor is squeezed
out by a security interest burgeoning with nonadvance obligations,
equilibrium is not conceptually reinstated to quell the disturbing prospect
of a competitor finishing last but prevailing nevertheless.
But neither is the multiple view maximally coherent. The concept of
nonadvance obligations amounting to individual races, much like the
concept of future advances so understood, stands in satisfying proximity to
our epistemic knowledge of the race. That is, it more closely resembles
epistemic knowledge of the race in its prototypical sense than does the
unitary view, which avoids incoherence only by elaboration to cross-
metaphor coherence. But the notion of the race ending with nonadvance
obligations controverts the journey metaphor by replacing the value step to
a perfected security interest with nonadvances. To treat future nonadvances
in the same manner as future advances so far as distributive priorities are
concerned also requires that the two concepts be conflated.
As they relate to future nonadvances, parallel exposition of the unitary
and multiple views in terms of Experientialist cognitive theory proves only
that both the unitary and multiple views are more or less confirmable at the
level of metaphoric analysis, although neither yields entirely coherent
results. There is nothing surprising in this, because it is only to say that
conventional discourse on both sides of the question proceeds along the
lines established by its own metaphoric premise, the race to priority. The
exercise, in other words, is an exercise in translation and therefore cannot
alone resolve the priority issue under consideration.
Bringing to light the metaphors at work does disclose, however, why the
propositional arguments are not wholly satisfying and therefore seem
inconclusive. The question addressed by the propositional arguments-does
the postlien, future nonadvance obligation or the creditor's lien finish first
in the race to priority?-invites only one answer-either the nonadvance
obligation is first or the creditor's lien is first. It is the secured party who
is prior if the race to priority ends with the creation and perfection of the
security interest based on the initial advance. If the race to priority ends
when the future nonadvance obligation becomes due, the lien creditor is
first.
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The answer is tautological because the underlying metaphor of the race
can lead nowhere else. The conceptual battle is pitched within the confines
of the race metaphor and its entailments, and the metaphor thus creates an
expository imperative that locates the parameters of the debate according
to its own terms. The results of the future nonadvance priority question
addressed in terms of the Coogan-Gilmore debate is irresolute at the level
of ordinary discourse, and this is so precisely because discourse cannot
proceed beyond the bounds of its underlying metaphor.
What should be clear from the foregoing is that the concepts of the
nonadvance obligation and the future advance obligation have been
conflated in the discourse on the nature of the security interest. The
explanation seems to be that the temporal dimension they share has been
elevated to become controlling, such that they are treated as one on that
basis alone. Certainly, future advances and nonadvances share their
temporal positions in the future of the creation of the original security
interest, but their dissimilarities are lost in the bargain.
There is nothing, however, that requires nonadvance obligations to be
understood according to the same metaphor by which future advances are
understood. On the theory that the race, unitary, and multiple metaphors are
wrung dry of expository power in the case of future nonadvances, we might
abandon them in thinking about distributive priorities."'
The metaphor of the unitary security interest is just that-a partially
descriptive model constructed out of perceived dimensional correspondenc-
es among target and source concepts. It is a metaphoric choice constrained
by principles of consistency and coherence, measured with particular
reference to the ontological and structural metaphors which by consensus
structure Article 9. To state the unitary, or any other, view as a proposition-
al truth, as a concept reflecting some objective state of affairs outside
cognitive operations, is not to make it one. Nevertheless, the analytic
program under state law has been to decide upon a concept of the security
interest (and it seems the unitary conceptualization is prevailing), then to
declare the selection as a proposition. The effects of this sort of formalism
are obvious so far as deciding the priority status of future nonadvance
obligations under state law. It is to foreclose alternate avenues of inquiry
into priorities under Article 9 and to inhibit law transformation.
But the propositional treatment quietly works its way into other doctrinal
178. Cf. Donald R. Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law,
71 TEX. L. REv. 541 (1993); Christopher M.E. Painter, Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured
Credit System: Asbestos Times, The Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1045 (1985).
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fora as well. In the upcoming section, I suggest that acceptance of an
analytic program that begins with the unitary metaphor as a proposition has
infected the bankruptcy forum as well.
IV. FUTURE NONADVANCE OBLIGATIONS AS VOIDABLE TRANSFERS
UNDER § 547 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Part III proposed that the metaphors of the journey and the race
established the metaphoric parameters of the debate over the nature of the
security interest. As they are central to structuring the concepts by which
secured transactions are understood, they establish the allowable range of
conceptual alternatives for the debate. The race metaphor thus enabled, yet
delimited, the discussion of future advance priorities, channeling discourse
in the direction of the nature of the security interest as multiple or
unitary. 179
Part III also advanced the claims that the debate about the nature of the
security interest as unitary or multiple became the conceptual imprimatur
for discourse on future nonadvance obligations, and that the unitary
metaphor seems to be achieving dominance. The general claim in Part IV
is that the debate over the nature of the security interest has likewise been
the conceptual beginning and ending point for deliberation on the status of
future advance and nonadvance obligations in bankruptcy. The particular
claim is that as the unitary view is awarded preeminence, it is being
imported to the preference doctrine, there to obfuscate issues relating to
avoidance of future nonadvance obligations.
A. Preference Doctrine in General
State law, in its ecumenical indifference to equal treatment of creditors
inter se, does not condemn a debtor's preferential treatment of one creditor
at the expense of another. By contrast, equal treatment of creditors similarly
situated is emphatically bankruptcy policy."' So it is that the Bankruptcy
Code, through § 547(b), will undo many transfers by a debtor to its
179. Certainly, the unitary and multiple metaphors are competing conceptualizations, but neither
departs radically from the guidelines set by the journey and race metaphors. Both emerge naturally
within that conceptual framework and both are coherent with it.
180. "[T]he preference provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution
among creditors of the debtor." H.tL REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (1988) (providing for pro rata distribution
of the estate within classes of claimants).
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favorites on the eve of bankruptcy. 81
The requirements for avoidance"8 2 are a transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property to or for the benefit of a creditor, made on account of
an antecedent debt (a debt owed by the debtor before the offending transfer
was made), and made within ninety days of the filing of the petition" 3
while the debtor was insolvent. 184 Finally, the transfer must have improved
the transferee's position as creditor: because of the transfer, the transferee
will capture more estate property with which to reduce its claim than it
would under the distributive provisions of the Bankruptcy Code alone. 5
181. The seminal article discussing the history and development of bankruptcy preference doctrine
is Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713
(1985). For a consideration of preference law proceeding from the history of its philosophical premises,
see John C. MeCoid, II, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 VA. L.
RMv,. 249 (1981); Robert Weisberg, Commercial Reality, the Merchant Character, and the History of
the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1986). See also Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T.
Kronman, Voidable Preferences and the Protection of the Expectation Interest, 60 MINN. L. REv. 971
(1976).
182. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(l)-(5) (1988).
183. Where the creditor is an insider, the period is extended from ninety days to one year. 11
U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988).
184. Under § 547(f), a debtor is presumed insolvent for ninety days preceding bankruptcy. 11
U.S.C. § 547(f) (1988). Where the transfer is to an insider, it is susceptible to avoidance for one year,
but the trustee loses the presumption and so is put to her proof on the insolvency element. 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(g) (1988).
185. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 372 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6328. The transfer must have a preferential effect on the estate. See Countryman, supra note 181, at
733; Charles J. Young, Preference Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221,
224 (1980). The determination is made according to the following analysis. First, a Chapter 7
liquidation is hypothesized. This entails estimating the value of the debtor's assets as of the time the
petition is filed. In re Rimmer Corp., 80 B.R. 337, 339 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). See also In re Tenna
Corp., 801 F.2d 819, 821-24 (6th Cir. 1984). Next, the relevant distributive provision in straight
bankruptcy (i.e., § 726) is consulted to calculate what the transferee would have received in Chapter
7 exclusive of the transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5)(A)-(C) (1988). See, e.g., Braniff Airways, Inc. v.
Exxon Co., 814 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir. 1987). The Bankruptcy Code does not state the certainty
required of the calculation, but presumably something less than absolute certainty will do since the
object of the calculation is only to decide whether the transferee received more in satisfaction of its
claim than it would have received otherwise. See Craig v. Minden Exch. Bank & Trust Co. (In re
Craig), 92 B.R. 394, 398 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988). Finally, the result of the calculation is compared with
the sum of the value of the property transferred and the amount the creditor would receive in the
hypothetical straight bankruptcy. See In re Lewis W. Shurtleff, Inc., 778 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir.
1985). By definition, where the transferee is an unsecured creditor and would receive anything short
of 100% distribution in Chapter 7, its position is improved by a prepetition transfer of property. See In
re Chattanooga Wholesale Antiques, Inc., 930 F.2d 458, 465 (6th Cir. 1991).
A corollary statement of the preferential effect requirement sometimes finds expression in cases
involving transferees with fully secured or oversecured claims. Transfers to such creditors are sometimes
said to have no preferential effect because they do not diminish the bankruptcy estate. This is because
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The following illustration exemplifies the prototypical case for avoidance.
C is an unsecured creditor with a $100,000 claim against D. Within ninety
days of the date D files for relief in Chapter 7, D makes a $25,000
payment to C on account of the debt, reducing C's claim to $75,000. What
remains of the bankruptcy estate for distribution in the Chapter 7 case will
permit a distribution to unsecured creditors of ten cents on the dollar. D's
trustee now endeavors to recover the $25,000 payment from C for the
estate.
Under the stingiest of definitions, and certainly under the generous one
found in the Bankruptcy Code,186 the payment to C is a transfer of
property.8 7 Supposing the payment was made within the ninety-day
preference period, it remains only to decide whether the payment was
preferential in its effect.'88 The bankruptcy estate hypothesized is adequate
to satisfy the claims of D's creditors at a level of ten per cent, so that
$10,000 would have been distributed to C on its allowed claim of
$100,000. If the $25,000 payment is not retrieved, C will collect ten
percent on the $75,000 balance of its claim to garner a total of $32,500. C
is therefore better off for the payment and the transfer is avoidable by D's
trustee.
The case of the security transfer, as distinguished from the absolute
transfer in the form of payment in the example, brings us conceptually
nearer to preference doctrine in relation to future nonadvance obligations.
Security transfers, like absolute transfers, are subject to challenge and
payments to filly secured creditors are attended by a corresponding release of the debtor's equity in
the collateral, which is thereby substituted for the property transferred. See Countryman, supra note 18 1,
at 739-40 (tracing the diminution-of-the-estate principle to its pre-Bankruptcy Code origins, and finding
it a generally correct but less "felicitous interpretation" of § 547(b)(5) than the preferential effect
analysis called for by the express language of the provision).
186. Section 101(58) defines transfer to mean "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or
conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in
property." 11 U.S.C. § 101(58) (1988). "Put simply, 'transfer' includes ... any event that results in
eliminating or diluting the debtor's interest in property. The form and circumstances of the event are
irrelevant, as are the nature and size of the interest that is transferred." 1 DAVID EPSTEIN El AL.,
BANKRUPTCY, PRACrITIONER TREATISE SERIES 512 (1992).
187. Property is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, but would appear to include any interest that
might usefully be distributed to creditors in bankruptcy in satisfaction of their claims. See, e.g., Danning
v. Bozek, 836 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988); see also, 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(1) (1988) (defining property of the estate as "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case").
188. The debtor is presumed insolvent for the ninety days preceding banrkruptcy. See supra note
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avoidance as preferential. 8 9 A creditor to whom the debtor transfers an
interest in property as security for a formerly unsecured debt within the
preference period will be made to disgorge the interest transferred, not in
the sense of disgorging a cash payment,' but in the sense of being forced
to resume its former unsecured position, there to take its pro rata distribu-
tion along side other unsecured claimants. 9 ' Where the transfer for security
is avoided, the conveyance is undone, and the property enters the estate
free of the lien. 92
Suppose that C in the illustration above had taken a security interest in
D's equipment as collateral for the $100,000 obligation, but that the
equipment is valued at something more than the debt, say $150,000. Again,
D makes the $25,000 payment on its account within the ninety-day
preference period. Supposing all other details of the example to be as
originally stated, C is no better off for the transfer, that is, the payment has
no preferential effect. C's claim would be fully satisfied out of the
collateral in any event,1 93 and the $25,000 does not increase C's recovery.
189. As indicated supra note 186, the term transfer is broadly defined in the Bankruptcy Code,
sufficiently so to reach voluntary transfers for security, see, e.g., Vogel v. Russell Transfer, Inc., 852
F.2d 797, 798 (4th Cir. 1988), Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc. v. Chemical Bank (In re Rubin Bros.
Footwear, Inc.), 73 B.R. 346, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), and to reach involuntary security transfers as well,
see, e.g., Decatur Contracting v. Belin, Belin, & Naddeo, 898 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1990). Indeed, most
preference litigation is over security transfers, the fiing of consensual and involuntary liens. STEPHEN
E. SNYDER & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION 10-41 (1989).
190. Section 547 says no more than that the trustee can avoid preferential transfers. 1 I U.S.C. § 547
(1988). When a conveyance is undone, of course, the property must find its way to some quarter.
Section 550(a) authorizes the trustee to retrieve the property from the transferee, and § 541(a)(3)
includes such property in the estate. Where specific retrieval from the transferee is impossible or
inequitable, the trustee may recover instead the monetary equivalent of the conveyance. 11 U.S.C.
§ 550(a) (1988). See General Indus. v. Shea (In re General Indus.), 79 B.R. 124, 134-35 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1987).
191. The claim survives, but as an unsecured claim. II U.S.C. § 502(h) (1988).
192. The Bankruptcy Code is not a model of clarity on this point, thereby inviting alternate
theoretical explanations of the effect of avoidance on liens. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 186, at 203-
07. Under any theoretical rationale, the practical consequence of avoidance is to rid property of the
estate of the lien. See SNYDER & PONOROFF, supra note 189, at 10-4, 10-164.1.
193. The Bankruptcy Code provides an elaborate schedule of distribution in Chapter 7 for all sorts
of claims, see, e.g., 1 I U.S.C. §§ 507, 726 (1988), but secured claims are not to be found among those
listed. This may be because the "priority" of a secured creditor as to its collateral is a matter so obvious
as to require no treatment, as one treatise suggests. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 186, at 300. Or it
may simply be that secured creditors are unconsciously taken to be conceptually nearer to owners with
the debtor (after the fashion of tenants in common) rather than claimants, such that priority does not
accurately express their relationship to the collateral. Cf. I U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988) (describing a
secured creditor's "interest" in property of the estate); I U.S.C. § 725 (1988). In any event, the right
of a secured creditor to the collateral or its proceeds, all of the proceeds if the creditor is undersecured
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This state of affairs inspires the axiom, payments to a fully secured or
oversecured creditor are by hypothesis not preferential. 94
B. Principal Metaphors That Define Preference Doctrine
Before assessing the avoidability of future nonadvance obligations, a
brief explication of the metaphoric concepts in preference doctrine is in
order. The organizing metaphoric principle is the ontological metaphor of
the container. To be the subject of avoidance, transfers must occur within
the preference period, as bounded by a date ninety days before filing and
the time of filing the bankruptcy petition.' The preference period is itself,
therefore, a container for events that occur within or without it.'96
The relevant event is a transfer of a debtor's property, which is
metaphorically cast for this purpose according to the simple ontological
metaphor, the transfer is an entity. 97 The transfer must occur while the
debtor is insolvent. States, like insolvency and perfection, are understood
or fully but not oversecured, is beyond argument. See GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 289 (2d ed. 1988).
194. See, e.g., Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. St. Johnsburg Trucking Co. (In re Mason & Dixon
Lines, Inc.), 65 B.R. 973, 977 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1986). I challenge this axiom as it relates to future
nonadvance obligations. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
195. There is as well a temporal component. Section 547(b)(2), for instance, requires that the debt
on account of which the transfer sought to be avoided must have come ahead of the transfer of property.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (1988). In subsection (b)(4) the transfer must have been made within ninety days
before the filing of the petition (I am ignoring here the extended period for insiders). II U.S.C.
§ 547(b)(4) (1988). The time-frame of the preference period thus begins at a point defined by subsection
(4) and ends with commencement of the bankruptcy case.
196. The concepts structuring preference doctrine are thus coherent with the journey metaphor that
defines the life of the Article 9 security interest. See supra Part III.A. In some cases, preference doctrine
seems to incorporate the journey metaphor directly, as in the exceptions from avoidance created for
certain transfers in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1988). For instance, § 547(c)(1) excepts from the trustee's
avoiding power transfers both intended and in fact contemporaneous with-occuring at the same point
as-new value extended to the debtor. Section 547(c)(2) excepts transfers made "in the ordinary
course" of the debtor's business or financial affairs, while (c)(4) saves transfers if"afler such transfer,
such creditor gave new value to ... the debtor" (emphasis added). Section 547(c)(5), the complex
provision governing floating liens in inventory, similarly relies on the journey metaphor understood as
a container, the bounds of which are established by beginning and ending points. 11 U.S.C. § 547
(1988).
197. The transfer is further defined by the source-path-goal image schema, by which something of
value passes from one party to the next. This schema is discussed supra note 95. A more concrete
instantiation of the schema involves the physical transfer of something tangible, money or goods. The
security transfer, except in the case of the pledge (the possessory security interest of Article 9), entails
no palpable transfer and must be comprehended metaphorically by reference to the well-defined
dimensions of the physical transfer.
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metaphorically as substances,' 9 and the debtor must therefore occupy that
state within the container of the preference period.
The debt is conceived of as an entity so that it may be fixed at a point
coincident with, antecedent to, or subsequent to the offending transfer. 99
The temporal relationship is thus figured according to a linear schema. This
conceptualization enables the debt to be fixed at some point along a
metaphorical path. This adds an additional metaphoric layer to that of the
preference period as container, further defining the transfer as a relevant
event along the same linear path as the debt.
It is the entailments of these metaphors that count. Once it is concluded
that a debt falls along the temporal path at a point ahead of the transfer,
and once it is concluded the transfer is within the metaphoric container
representing the preference period, the transfer is subject to the forces
within that container, namely, avoidance.
The metaphoric concepts evident in preference doctrine are sometimes
consistent but always coherent with the metaphors in Article 9. The notion
of the preference period as container is consistent with the principle
metaphor in Article 9, the secured transaction is ajourney.20° The concept
of the debt, transfer, and insolvency period as occupying various positions
along a metaphoric line presents a different and simpler image than the
journey metaphor, but is coherent with it. In the upcoming discussion of
nonadvance obligations, it will become apparent that the consistency and
coherence of the metaphors in the preference doctrine and Article 9 are
significant because preference law directly incorporates the journey and
race metaphors from Article 9.
C. The Multiple and Unitary Metaphors in Preference Doctrine: Yet
Another Forum for the Coogan-Gilmore Debate
A comparison of two kinds of cases involving nonadvance obligations
lends support to the claims made in the introduction to this Part. The first
case, call it Type 1, is the sort from earlier discussion of state law priorities
and future nonadvance obligations. Briefly, it involves nonadvance
obligations, such as interest, commitment, and attorney's fees, liquidated at
198. See supra note 141 for an account of states as substances and substances as containers.
199. Debts and obligations, as earlier indicated, are understood metaphorically as containers and
constraints that bind those owing them. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. Development of
the concept beyond the simple entity metaphor is unnecessary in applying preference doctrine, however.
200. Journeys, races, and other events are understood metaphorically as containers. See supra note
127 and accompanying text.
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some time future of an initial extension of credit and preceded by a security
agreement and properly filed financing statement.2"' As before, it is
assumed that the value of the collateral exceeds the face amount of the
original debt that initially animated the secured transaction.
To these particulars is added a single complicating feature, the supposi-
tion that the nonadvance obligations are liquidated in amount within the
ninety days before the debtor petitions for bankruptcy.2" The question is
thus whether a preference occurs as interest, commitment, and attorney's
fees accumulate within the preference period.
Certainly, assuming the value of the receivables exceeds the face amount
of the debt, there will be at some point a transfer of property, because a
secured party will lay claim to so much of the collateral as is required to
satisfy the nonadvance obligations. With each dollar the secured creditor
spends on attorney's fees, with each month that passes during which
interest and committment fees accrue, more money is wrung from the
debtor's equity. But for the conveyance of equity to meet the nonadvance
obligations, the secured party would be left with an unsecured claim for its
debtor's promise to pay them. Unless there is a one hundred percent
distribution in bankruptcy, the secured party is obviously better off-it is
able to satisfy its claim for nonadvance debt at one hundred cents on the
dollar out of collateral. 3 In bankruptcy, the leeching of a debtor's equity,
coinciding precisely with each dollar of attorney's fees paid by the secured
party, not only divests the debtor of equity, it reduces the value of an asset
201. See supra text following note 51 for the hypothetical.
202. For present purposes, it is unnecessary to hypothesize an unsecured creditor who acquires a
lien between the creation and perfection of the original security interest and the liquidation of future
nonadvance obligations.
203. The implication of the statement may at first seem heretical-transfers to oversecured creditors
can be preferential. Of course, this contradicts the well-established axiom to the contrary: transfers to
oversecured creditors are not preferential because they leave the transferee no better off than had the
transfer not been made. See In re EDC, Inc., 930 F.2d 1275, 1282 (7th Cir. 1991); In re Hagen, 922
F.2d 742, 745-46 (1lth Cir. 1991); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Exxon Co., 814 F.2d 1030, 1033-40 (5th
Cir. 1987). On reflection, the statement is not so startling after all. The axiom begins with the
presumption of a fully secured creditor. Payments to such creditors simply amount to substituting one
kind of property--cash-for another-the pro tanto liberation of equity from the lien.
But payments to a fully secured creditor where the security interest is voidable are functionally
payments to an unsecured creditor, and the payments themselves may likewise be avoided. See, e.g.,
In re Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc., 73 B.R. 346, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). In considering whether future
nonadvance obligations are preferential transfers of equity to a creditor, to begin with the proposition
that the creditor is fully secured begs the question. The creditor seeking to satisfy future nonadvance
obligations out of a debtor's equity may hold a secured claim voidable under § 547, and may not be
an oversecured creditor as to those obligations.
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otherwise available for distribution to unsecured creditors. The liquidation
(the fixing of the exact amount of the nonadvance debt, and thereby the
fixing of the precise levels of equity needed to satisfy it) of future
nonadvance obligations within ninety days of bankruptcy suggests
avoidability.
Again, to invoke the avoidance power, § 547 requires that a transfer
occur within the preference period, on account of an antecedent debt, and
that it leave the secured creditor better off than otherwise. The first two
requirements are simply expressions of the container and time-as-linear-path
metaphors that structure preference doctrine. The third is largely useless as
an instrument for judging whether a preference exists or not in the context
of future nonadvance obligations. It is instead a condition that will be
proclaimed or denied depending completely upon the decisions reached
concerning the first two requirements.
Deciding whether a preference results under the circumstances outlined
in the illustration is all a matter of the way the nonadvance obligation-the
debt-and the leeching of equity-the transfer-are understood. The
conceptual choices are not infinite, as might be supposed. The container
metaphors that define preference doctrine, and the subsidiary metaphors that
define debt and transfer, closely circumscribe the available conceptual
alternatives. Specifically, the concept of the future nonadvance obligation
must come to be understood as the "antecedent debt," and the erosion of
equity must come to be understood as the "transfer of an interest in
property" of § 547. Conceiving of the nonadvance obligation as debt
presents no special difficulty, although deciding when future nonadvance
debt arises is highly problematic. This difficulty, coupled with the problems
of conceptualizing the loss of equity to nonadvance obligations as a transfer
of property and deciding when such a transfer occurs, make further analysis
in terms of these metaphors nearly impossible.
For example, it is possible to conceive of nonadvance debt as arising
spontaneously and in perfect correspondence with expenditures for
attorney's fees and the regular addition of commitment fees and interest. If
the consequent relocation of equity to meet that nonadvance debt with
security is taken as occurring on the liquidation of those obligations, the
debt and transfer spring into existence at once, and the debt is not
antecedent to the transfer. Every dollar of debt is instantaneously met with
a dollar of transfer.
On the other hand, it seems equally plausible to think of the nonadvance
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debt as arising in the security agreement with the debtor's promises, the
time the debtor becomes contractually bound to pay nonadvance obligations
in the future. That the obligation was then contingent on the passage of
time, in the case of interest and commitment fees, and on the secured
creditor's actually incurring attorney's fees would seem to present no
obstacle to this view.205 On this conceptualization, so long as we sustain
the assumption that equity in the collateral was conveyed as each dollar of
debt was identified, the nonadvance debt is antecedent thereto, and the
transfer preferential.
The analysis is confounded, however. On the same principle that
commissions the view of the nonadvance debt as originating in the security
agreement, it might as easily be said that subsequent withdrawal of equity
to meet nonadvance debt simply completes a conveyance already made in
the security agreement, albeit a conveyance then contingent on actual
expenditures. On this reasoning, the contingent transfer and the contingent
debt are once more synchronous and the transfer beyond the reach of
§ 547.
As to security transfers of personalty, bankruptcy law offers incomplete
guidance in deciding either when a debt, nonadvance obligation or
otherwise, arises or when a transfer of equity to meet a nonadvance
obligation is made. The Bankruptcy Code does state that a security transfer
204. This very issue has been raised in cases where a trustee or debtor in possession has sought to
avoid as preferential cash payments within the preference period on account of interest to unsecured or
undersecured creditors. The discussion focuses on whether the debt represented by interest arises with
the signing of the note and was therefore antecedent to cash payments, or whether the debt arises only
as interest comes due.
One line of cases reasons that interest is simply rent for the use of principal, and that like rental
payments for the use of property or debt for utility services, no obligation to pay arises until the debtor
has had use of the funds advanced for the interest period. Accordingly, either debt for interest is not
antecedent to interest payments and so not preferential, the payments on account of interest arc
substantially contemporaneous with the debt and within the § 547(c)(1) exception, or payments on
account of interest are made in the ordinary course of business and so within the exception of
§ 547(c)(2). See, e.g., In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 842 F.2d 729, 730 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Jeffrey
Bigelow Design Group, Inc., 127 B.1. 580, 585 (D. Md. 1991), aj'd, 956 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1992);
In re Iowa Svcs. Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 1109, 1111 (8th Cir. 1982).
A contrary line of authority holds that the obligation to pay interest arises when the loan is made.
See, e.g., In re Western World Funding, Inc., 54 B.R. 470,480 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985); In re Winn, 127
B.R 697, 701 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991). Cf. In re CHG Int'l, Inc., 897 F.2d 1479, 1482 (9th Cir. 1990).
If nothing else, the disagreement over the question is testimony to the difficulty associated with the
journey metaphor in deciding when a preference has occurred.
205. In the Bankruptcy Code "debt" is defined in terms of a "claim," 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1988),
and a claim is a right to payment whether matured or contingent, liquidated or not, 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(5)(A) (1988).
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is deemed made when it is effective between the transferor and transferee,
provided it is perfected within ten days after that time."6 Otherwise, the
transfer is deemed made at the time of perfection.0 7
But when a security transfer is perfected is a question left to state law to
answer. Section 547(e)(1)(B) provides that a transfer is perfected from the
point a creditor cannot acquire a lien superior to the transferee's interest,
a point that must be determined by reference to U.C.C. section 9-301(4).
Analysis is thereby driven once more to flounder in the quagmire of the
Coogan-Gilmore debate.
Consider now a second kind of nonadvance preference case, Type 2,
represented in the following illustration. Bank lends $50,000 to Debtor on
a secured basis. The agreement provides that the collateral, valued at
$100,000, will secure all obligations of Debtor to Bank, not just the
primary indebtedness which animated the transaction, but including such
indebtedness of Debtor as Bank might thereafter acquire by assignment or
otherwise. Trade Creditor has a $30,000 unsecured claim against Debtor
and, having little faith in its prospects for successful collection, sells its
claim to Bank at a substantial discount for, say, $10,000.201 Within ninety
days of the assignment Debtor petitions for bankruptcy relief, whereupon
Bank files a proof of claim maintaining that the assigned claim, unsecured
in the hands of Trade Creditor, has become secured by dint of the all-
indebtedness clause in the security agreement. Bank accordingly insists that
it receive the first $75,000 of proceeds from the sale of the collateral. The
trustee argues that the inflation of the secured obligation from the
assignment, naturally accompanied by a transfer of Debtor's equity, is a
206. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (1988).
207. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(B) (1988). The Bankruptcy Code also instructs us that, for preference
purposes, no transfer can occur until a debtor has rights in the property conveyed. Thus, where a debtor
conveys in a security agreement an interest in personalty it has yet to acquire, the conveyance does not
take place as of the security agreement, but on the debtor's acquisition of the collateral. 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e)(3) (1988).
208. In the alternative, consider that Debtor has reduced its primary obligation to Bank to a trifling
balance. The security agreement contains an all-indebtedness clause providing that the collateral secures
all debts owed by Debtor to Bank, together with debts owed any assignee of Bank. Trade Creditor, with
a huge, unsecured claim against Debtor, buys out Bank's secured claim by satisfying the negligible
balance and takes the security interest by assignment. Debtor defaults on its debt to Trade Creditor,
which claims secured status both as to the balance originally owed Bank and the theretofore unsecured
debt.
In a thorough and excellent treatment of assignments that convert unsecured to secured debt, one
commentator describes the first kind of assignment as creating an inflatable lien, and the second type
as creating a negotiable lien. See generally Flechtner, supra note 18. For an earlier treatment of
assignments that convert unsecured obligations to secured debt, see Shanor, supra note 51.
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preferential transfer and avoidable.
The secured status of the principle debt owed Bank, the $50,000 loan,
is not open to doubt. As to the $25,000 claim Bank acquired by assign-
ment, two questions present themselves for necessary resolution, necessary
since without answering them the ontological element of the transfer cannot
be crammed within or safely excluded from the container of the preference
period.
One is whether the security transfer took place at the time Debtor created
the security interest in favor of Bank and therefore occurred outside the
preference period, or whether the transfer took place at the time the claim
was assigned and therefore transpired within the preference period. The
other question is whether the debt secured arose out of the assignment
clause in the security agreement with Bank, or whether it arose when
Debtor became obligated to Trade Creditor. If the former, the time of
transfer of equity to secure the assigned claim and the time of the debt are
one. In that case, the debt is not antecedent to the transfer and no
preference results. If the latter, the debt antedates the transfer, which is
therefore preferential and avoided by Debtor's trustee.
The conceptual difficulties in the case of assignments are, in other words,
nearly identical to those raised by the Type 1 case. This similarity is hardly
remarkable given what does or does not fit within the preference period
depends once more on section 9-301(4), in the presence of which the
analysis is saluted with the Coogan-Gilmore debate. Such it is that future
nonadvance obligations push the controlling metaphors of the journey and
the race to their expository limits.
What is somewhat remarkable is that while Type 2 cases (assignments)
have been the subject of both cases and commentary, the possibility that
Type 1 cases might be avoidable as preferences seems to have escaped
attention entirely. Considering that Type 1 cases have the same erosive
effect on the bankruptcy estate, how can it be that they have eluded the
preference challenge?
The obvious answer may be that § 506(b) precludes any such argument.
It provides that where the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the
allowed claim (i.e., the creditor is oversecured), interest, fees, costs, and
charges provided for in the security agreement are annexed to the secured
claim, and they are added until the debtor's equity is exhausted." 9 But this
answer presumes the nonadvance obligations are unavoidably secured to
209. I1 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988).
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begin with. Moreover, the fees, costs, and the like of which § 506(b)
speaks seem to be the very same future nonadvance obligations under
discussion. If that section precludes § 547(b), then Congress has created an
unstated exception to the preference rule outside those enumerated in
§ 547(c). 210
If nothing else, some interesting questions about the relationship of the
two provisions present themselves. For instance, does § 506(b) apply first
to preempt § 547(b) as to all such charges, fees, and costs, or are they
secured under § 506(b) but open to scrutiny as possible preferences? If
those charges are reviewable under § 547, would preference doctrine
eviscerate § 506(b)?
In partial answer to the last question raised, application of preference law
to § 506(b) fees and the like would certainly circumscribe that provision,
but the provision might otherwise operate in a number of possible ways.
First, § 506(b) has in mind postpetition interest, fees, costs, and charges.
Immunity from preference doctrine might therefore begin and end with the
filing of the petition.21 Nonadvance obligations provided for in the security
agreement liquidated to certainty within ninety days before the bankruptcy
case would be open to challenge as preferential. Some would fall before the
challenge where the elements of § 547(b) are met and no exception in
§ 547(c) is found to apply.1
The object here, however, is not necessarily to advocate avoidance of
nonadvance obligations nor to urge any particular interpretation of
§ 506(b), although a normative case can be made for both. It is to call
attention to what appears to be an assymetry in the treatment of
210. The exceptions are contained in 11 U.S.C. § 547(6)(1)-(5) (1988).
211. There is some policy justification for this position, namely, that postpetition nonadvance
obligations have a special claim to certain payment because of the effects of the bankruptcy petition
and stay. Such costs might therefore be thought of as occasioned by the bankruptcy and particularly
deserving. Cf 1 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988) (requiring termination, annulment, or modification of the stay
for lack of adequate protection where impairment of the secured claim is attributable to the stay itself).
See In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 B.R. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
212. Others would not. Consider interest accruing within the preference period. Interest might be
thought of as rent for funds advanced with no obligation to pay it until the debtor has actually had use
of the funds for the interest period. Each dollar of equity might thus be regarded as transferred as each
dollar of interest accrues, that is, as the debtor enjoys a dollar's worth of use of the funds advanced.
If so, the debt for interest is not antecedent to the transfer, and no preference occurs.
Of course, this line of analysis simply directs attention back to the journey metaphor and requires
renewed consideration of the questions: when does the interest obligation arise, and when is the equity
in the collateral conveyed? Whether the debtor received something of value for the equity transferred
would seem the more fruitful inquiry. Cf Flechtner, supra note 18, 731-32.
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nonadvance obligations: when they take the form of an assignment,
nonadvance obligations have been attacked as preferential; when they take
the form of costs, fees, or interest, they have not. The arguments raised
here concerning possible interpretive limitations on § 506(b) may or may
not be convincing, but they are not untenable and, above all, they are by
no means so subtle as to be generally illusive. Doubtless, there are many
other arguments that might be raised besides. In short, § 506(b) does not
in itself readily explain away the assymetrical treatment given Type 1 and
Type 2 cases.
The analytic themes of the present treatment suggest one explanation. In
working out the relative priority of future nonadvance obligations under
state law, the conceptual treatment given future advances, proceeding from
the race metaphor as implemented mainly through the unitary view, spread
to future nonadvances. The conflation of the concepts of the future
advance and nonadvance in the literature and cases create a conceptual
monopoly in favor of the unitary view." 3 When future nonadvances are
understood according to the unitary view, avoidance under § 547(b) is
conceptually unavailable.
Conflating the concepts, thus allowing them to be ruled collectively by
the metaphor of the unitary security interest, has two drawbacks. First, it
is evident that the same doctrinal impasse that plagues analysis under state
law complicates preference doctrine as it relates to nonadvance obligations,
even in Type 2 cases where the possibility of avoidance has at least been
raised. Against the background of the race metaphor under state law,
discourse necessarily deteriorates into a set of metaphysical conundrums
that force analysis of the nature of the security interest as either unitary or
multiple." 4 The unitary view, wrenched from its uncertain moorings in state
law future advance priorities, provides inconclusive responses to these
questions about nonadvance priorities. It does no better in the context of
preference doctrine.
Second, conflation of future advances and nonadvances eclipses
differences between them, differences we might wish to take account of
according to the set of conditions with which we are confronted. The
application of the unitary view to future nonadvances is not arbitrary.
Future advances and future nonadvance obligations share in common the
213. At a minimum, the treatment to date creates a conceptual monopoly in favor of treating the
whole issue as about the nature of the security interest as motivated by the race metaphor.
214. For example, when does a transfer occur, when does a debt arise, and so on.
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dimension of futurity and might for some purposes be usefully com-
pared. 21' Nevertheless, in highlighting shared dimensions, distinctions are
lost in the bargain, distinctions we otherwise might wish to preserve for
emphasis under other conditions.
The most significant distinction for preference law may be that, in the
case of future advances, while a debtor's equity is drained from the estate
as advances are made, advance value is substituted in its place. Nonadvance
obligations drain equity (i.e., take property), but substitute nothing
therefore. Reconceptualizing the nonadvance obligation, that is, disentan-
gling it from the concept of the future advance to highlight the exchange
dimension which the two do not share, both suggests and enables different
treatment of the two under § 547. None of this is to assert a single
explanation of the apparent assymetry in preference law as conclusive. The
disagreement and indeterminacy surrounding nonadvance obligations and
the susceptibilty of § 506(b) to varying constructions are, however,
provocative.
Preference law is animated by a policy of preventing last minute
improvements of position at the expense of the bankruptcy estate, at the
expense, that is, of unsecured creditors. With the probable exception of
interest, in the case of nonadvances, of course, there is no substitution of
property for that transferred by the debtor. The estate is simply depleted.
When analysis is reduced to a debate over the true nature of the security
interest as unitary or multiple, the substitution principle is for the most part
lost from view, or at least not underscored. The conceptual monopoly can
be dissolved only on recognizing that any statement about the nature of the
security interest is a metaphor.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
I would like the reader to leave this essay with the following points in
mind. Experientialism teaches that our concepts and what we "know" are
relative to our purposes and our conceptual system, a system that is mainly
metaphoric. These insights invite doctrinal critique uninhibited by reverence
for legal doctrine as propositional, and free of discredited notions about
transcendent concepts and knowledge. To say that legal rules and doctrine
are metaphorical constructs, however, is by no means to imply they are
somehow less legitimate than we might otherwise have supposed them to
215. Future nonadvances and future advances both may be understood as events antedating
execution of a security agreement and the initial extension of credit to the debtor.
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be. It is to say only that their measure is not an objectively verifiable set
of formal propositions, but the degree to which they advance our purposes.
At the same time it suggests legal doctrine is relative to human purpose
and imaginative rationality. Experientialism does not entail that we resign
ourselves to a view of the law as wildly, inevitably indeterminate. Our
conceptual system is grounded in common experience and constrained by
its own systematicity. In this way, the Experientialist program enables
critical attention to a specific aspect of legal doctrine within the context of
a metaphoric system of concepts established by a consensus," 6 for example,
the experiential consensus of the commercial community on the metaphoric
framework memorialized in Article 9.
It is possible, in other words, to critique individual rules within an
existing doctrinal context understood as a system of metaphoric concepts,
and to offer transformative solutions without calling for deconstruction of
the system itself. This is an important contribution of the Experientialist
program to legal discourse-it is the prospect of acknowledging legal
doctrine to be imaginative, relative, and purposeful, without being driven
inescapably to the skeptical stance that legal doctrine is hopelessly relative
to individual values. In short, we can be skeptical without becoming
skeptics.
216. Tushnet has argued that judges can do no more than interpret community values. MARK V.
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 144 (1988). It
would seem that, under the Experientialist program, we might readily concede this point without
concluding that the decisionmaking process is wholly value-laden and illegitimate. The cognitive
activities of judges are constrained (again, in the somewhat weaker Experientialist sense of the term)
by experience (i.e., in a broad sense-physiologically and culturally). It seems that while it is not
possible for the judiciary to disentangle itself from its human conceptual systems, neither would it be
desirable for it to do so. See generally Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied
Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. L. REv. 919, 969-
70 (1991) (arguing that the judiciary is an appropriate repository of community decisionmaking power).
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